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ESSAY 
The Measure of a Metric: 
The Debate over Quantifying  
Partisan Gerrymandering 
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos* & Eric M. McGhee† 
Abstract. Over the last few years, there has been an unprecedented outpouring of 
scholarship on partisan gerrymandering. Much of this work has sought either to 
introduce new measures of gerrymandering or to analyze a metric—the efficiency gap—
that we previously developed. In this Essay, we reframe the debate by presenting a series of 
criteria that can be used to evaluate gerrymandering metrics: (1) consistency with the 
efficiency principle; (2) distinctness from other electoral values; (3) breadth of scope; and  
(4) correspondence with U.S. electoral history. We then apply these criteria to both the
efficiency gap and other measures. The efficiency gap complies with our criteria under all
circumstances. Other metrics, in contrast, often violate the efficiency principle and cannot 
be used in certain electoral settings. 
* Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, University of
Chicago Law School. 
† Research Fellow, Public Policy Institute of California. 
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Introduction 
For several decades, there was “virtually a consensus [in] the scholarly 
community” about how to measure partisan gerrymandering.1 An analyst 
would estimate the seat shares the major parties would win in a state if 
(hypothetically) they each received the same vote share. The greater the 
divergence between the parties’ seat shares for the same (counterfactual) vote 
share, the larger a district plan’s partisan bias, and the more gerrymandered the 
plan.2 
Despite the metric’s wide acceptance among academics, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s pivotal member, Justice Kennedy, has expressed misgivings about 
partisan bias. In a 2006 case, he did not “altogether discount[] its utility in 
redistricting planning and litigation,” but he did worry that “[t]he existence or 
degree of [bias] may in large part depend on conjecture about where possible 
vote-switchers will reside.”3 He noted: “[W]e are wary of adopting a 
constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair results that 
would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs.”4 
The two of us agree with Justice Kennedy that it is odd to measure partisan 
gerrymandering based on how the major parties would have performed in 
counterfactual elections. It is more intuitive, in our view, to assess gerryman-
dering based on how the parties did perform in elections that in fact took place. 
That is why, a few years ago, we sought to unsettle the scholarly consensus in 
favor of partisan bias by introducing a new metric—the efficiency gap—that 
does not rely on predictions about what would occur in hypothetical electoral 
scenarios.5 
 
 1. See Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for 
Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 6 (2007) (noting the 
scholarly acceptance of “partisan symmetry” as a “standard for partisan fairness in 
plurality-based American elections”). 
 2. See id. at 6-13 (defining partisan bias and describing it as a “statistical measure of the 
deviation of an electoral system from partisan symmetry”). 
 3. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006) (opinion 
of Kennedy, J.). 
 4. Id. 
 5. McGhee first presented the efficiency gap (then known as relative wasted votes) in Eric 
McGhee, Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems, 39 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 55 (2014). The two of us then incorporated the measure into a potential legal 
test in Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the 
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015). 
  We recommend sensitivity testing (which requires the use of counterfactual elections) 
to establish the durability of a plan’s efficiency gap. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, 
supra, at 889-90. This testing, however, is distinct from the measure itself. It also 
involves the use of counterfactual elections that are generally more plausible than 
those used to calculate partisan bias (because they are closer to observed electoral 
outcomes). 
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The efficiency gap is rooted in the insight that partisan gerrymandering is 
always carried out in one of two ways: the cracking of a party’s supporters 
across many districts, in which their preferred candidates lose by relatively 
narrow margins, or the packing of a party’s backers into a few districts, in 
which their preferred candidates win by overwhelming margins.6 Both 
cracking and packing produce what are known as wasted votes—votes that do 
not contribute to a candidate’s election. In the case of cracking, all votes cast for 
the losing candidate are wasted; in the case of packing, votes cast for the 
winning candidate above the 50% (plus one) threshold needed for victory are 
wasted. The efficiency gap is simply one party’s total wasted votes in an 
election, minus the other party’s total wasted votes, divided by the total 
number of votes cast. It captures in a single figure the extent to which district 
lines crack and pack one party’s voters more than the other’s.7 
It is fair to say that since we introduced the efficiency gap, there has been 
an explosion of judicial and academic interest in the measurement of partisan 
gerrymandering. In the courts, one of us has helped to litigate a pair of lawsuits 
based in part on the efficiency gap—one a challenge to Wisconsin’s state house 
plan;8 the other, to North Carolina’s congressional map.9 The three-judge 
district court in the Wisconsin case struck down the plan on partisan 
gerrymandering grounds in November 2016—the first such victory in more 
than thirty years—and the state’s appeal is currently pending before the 
Supreme Court.10 In the North Carolina case, the three-judge district court also 
invalidated the map in January 2018.11 
In the academy, scholars have developed several new measures of partisan 
gerrymandering and have commented extensively on the efficiency gap. One 
of these new metrics is the mean-median difference: the difference between a 
 
 6. This insight has not escaped the courts. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 n.7 
(2004) (plurality opinion) (defining packing and cracking). 
 7. See McGhee, supra note 5, at 68-70; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 850-53. 
 8. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289, and 
jurisdiction postponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017). 
 9. Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C. 2018), stay granted, 138 S. Ct. 
923 (U.S. 2018), and appeal docketed, No. 17-1295 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2018). 
 10. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 843. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in 
Whitford on October 3, 2017. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill v. Whitford,  
No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017), 2017 WL 4517131. 
  Importantly, the efficiency gap is not the entirety of the legal test proposed in Whitford. 
Rather, the test requires (1) discriminatory intent; (2) a large and durable discriminato-
ry effect; and (3) the lack of any legitimate justification for that effect. See Whitford, 218 
F. Supp. 3d at 883-84. The efficiency gap is simply one way to establish the size of a 
discriminatory effect. See id. at 903-10. For the full discussion of the elements of the 
legal test and its application to Wisconsin’s state house map, see id. at 883-927. 
 11. See Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 597-98. 
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party’s mean vote share and its median vote share across all the districts in a 
plan. When a party’s median vote share is lower than its mean vote share, the 
party is arguably the victim of gerrymandering.12 Another new metric is the 
difference between the parties’ average margins of victory. If one party’s wins 
are more lopsided than the other party’s, this may indicate that its supporters 
have been cracked and packed by the district lines.13 Scholars have also 
proposed variants of both partisan bias (by averaging it across all electoral 
outcomes rather than for a single hypothetical election)14 and the efficiency 
gap (by varying the definitions and weights of the two types of wasted votes).15  
 
 12. See Robin E. Best et al., Considering the Prospects for Establishing a Packing Gerrymander-
ing Standard, 17 ELECTION L.J. 1, 4-5, 8-9 (2018); Michael D. McDonald & Robin E. Best, 
Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases, 14 
ELECTION L.J. 312, 317-18 (2015); Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Practical Tests for Gerryman-
dering: Application to Maryland and Wisconsin, 15 ELECTION L.J. 367, 372 (2016) [hereinaf-
ter Wang, Practical Tests]; Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of 
Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1263, 1304-05 (2016) [hereinafter Wang, Tests 
for Practical Evaluation]; Jonathan Krasno et al., Can Gerrymanders Be Measured?: An 
Examination of Wisconsin’s State Assembly 4-5 (May 28, 2016) (unpublished manu-
script), https://perma.cc/7TFY-JQFB. 
  The mean-median difference has recently been presented to courts in two amicus 
briefs. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Samuel S. Wang, Ph.D., in Support of Appellees at 4-7, 
Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016) (No. 14-232), 2015 
WL 6774017; Memorandum of Amici Curiae Common Cause & New Virginia 
Majority Regarding Proposed Remedial Plans at 7, Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. 
Supp. 3d 552 (E.D. Va. 2016) (No. 3:13-cv-00678-REP-LO-AD). 
 13. See Wang, Practical Tests, supra note 12, at 371-72; Wang, Tests for Practical Evaluation, 
supra note 12, at 1304. 
 14. See John F. Nagle, Measures of Partisan Bias for Legislating Fair Elections, 14 ELECTION L.J. 
346, 351-52 (2015) (suggesting plotting the regular seat-vote curve and its inverse and 
determining the space between them). Other scholars have recently defended partisan 
bias as the measure was originally formulated. See Theodore S. Arrington, A Practical 
Procedure for Detecting a Partisan Gerrymander, 15 ELECTION L.J. 385, 389-90 (2016); 
Anthony J. McGann et al., A Discernable and Manageable Standard for Partisan Gerry-
mandering, 14 ELECTION L.J. 295, 307-09 (2015). 
 15. See Christopher P. Chambers et al., Flaws in the Efficiency Gap, 33 J.L. & POL. 1, 12-23 
(2017); Benjamin Plener Cover, Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering: An Evaluation of 
the Efficiency Gap Proposal, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1181-84, 1215-22 (2018); John F. Nagle, 
How Competitive Should a Fair Single Member Districting Plan Be?, 16 ELECTION L.J. 196, 
199-203 (2017). Still other scholars have recently sought to measure gerrymandering by 
determining a plan’s deviation from the historical seat-vote curve, see Nicholas 
Goedert, Research Note, The Case of the Disappearing Bias: A 2014 Update to the “Gerry-
mandering or Geography” Debate, RES. & POL. 2-3 (2015), https://perma.cc/Y4YT-4HJC; 
Nicholas Goedert, Gerrymandering or Geography?: How Democrats Won the Popular Vote 
but Lost the Congress in 2012, RES. & POL. 2-3 (2014), https://perma.cc/9RCT-RWPW 
[hereinafter Goedert, Gerrymandering or Geography?], or by sorting districts by vote 
share and then calculating the angle between lines connecting each party’s median 
district to the 50% point, see Gregory S. Warrington, Quantifying Gerrymandering 
Using the Vote Distribution 2-4 (May 15, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://perma.cc/SXY8-UARS. 
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The academic discussion of the efficiency gap includes a number of 
criticisms of the measure. Writing in this journal’s pages, Benjamin Cover 
contends that the efficiency gap is in tension with important democratic 
values. In his view, it favors uncompetitive elections, discourages proportional 
representation, and incentivizes voter suppression.16 Cover and John Nagle 
also object to some of the methodological choices underpinning the efficiency 
gap: how wasted votes are defined and weighted, how imputations are made for 
uncontested races, and how variations in district-level turnout are addressed.17 
Wendy Tam Cho, Robin Best and colleagues, and Jonathan Krasno and 
colleagues further complain about the metric’s variability from election to 
election.18 These scholars present both toy examples of one or two districts and 
actual district plans that they argue demonstrate this variability.19 And 
Christopher Chambers and colleagues observe that the efficiency gap does not 
distinguish between moderate and extreme legislators. This oversight may 
allegedly lead to odd conclusions about certain maps.20 
We find these criticisms unpersuasive, and we explain why later in this 
Essay. We are also skeptical of the measures other scholars have recently 
advanced. But before diving into these metrics’ pros and cons, we think it is 
worthwhile to step back and ask what it is we want from a quantitative 
measure of partisan gerrymandering. What properties would such a metric 
ideally exhibit? 
One attribute is consistency with what one of us has labeled the efficiency 
principle. This is simply the idea that when a party’s seat share increases while 
its vote share remains constant, a measure should reflect that party’s growing 
advantage.21 The essence of partisan gerrymandering is winning more seats 
without appealing to more voters, and a valid metric should capture that 
conceptual core.  
A second feature is distinctness from other democratic values. District plans 
implicate not just partisan fairness but also electoral competitiveness, voter 
participation, legislative polarization, and so on. But it is only partisan 
unfairness that lies at the heart of partisan gerrymandering. Thus only such 
unfairness should be revealed by a gerrymandering measure. 
 
 16. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1163-64, 1169, 1189-93, 1202-05, 1213-15. 
 17. See id. at 1170-72, 1181-89; Nagle, supra note 15, at 199-203. 
 18. See Best et al., supra note 12, at 6; Wendy K. Tam Cho, Essay, Measuring Partisan 
Fairness: How Well Does the Efficiency Gap Guard Against Sophisticated as Well as Simple-
Minded Modes of Partisan Discrimination?, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 20-23 (2017); 
Krasno et al., supra note 12, at 11. 
 19. See Best et al., supra note 12, at 6; Cho, supra note 18, at 20-23; Krasno et al., supra  
note 12, at 11. 
 20. See Chambers et al., supra note 15, at 23-29. 
 21. See Eric McGhee, Measuring Efficiency in Redistricting, 16 ELECTION L.J. 1, 2 (2017). 
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A third criterion is breadth of scope. In other words, a metric should be 
usable under a range of electoral conditions: when the parties are evenly 
matched statewide or when one party predominates, when turnout is or is not 
roughly equal in each district, and when there are two or more than two 
parties competing for office. Without such flexibility, a measure would be 
inapplicable to many common scenarios.  
And a fourth characteristic is empirical correspondence. That is, the electoral 
ideal implied by a metric should not be too different from the historical norm 
in the United States. Otherwise the measure would imply that most plans in 
the United States have been gerrymanders—and its adoption would be so 
disruptive as to be infeasible.  
These criteria are why we endorse the efficiency gap. First, as suggested by 
its name, it is indeed consistent with the efficiency principle. When a party 
wins a larger (smaller) seat share for the same vote share, the metric always 
shifts in favor of (against) that party.  
Second, the efficiency gap does not conflate partisan fairness with other 
democratic values. In particular, there is no connection between the measure 
and electoral competitiveness. Conceptually, any efficiency gap is compatible 
with any level of competitiveness because it is only the difference between the 
parties’ average margins of victory that affects the metric. Empirically, too, 
U.S. elections have exhibited essentially a zero correlation between the 
efficiency gap and competitiveness over the last half-century.  
Third, as recently generalized by one of us, the efficiency gap is usable in 
almost every electoral environment: competitive or uncompetitive, with or 
without equal district turnout, and whether two or more than two parties are 
running.22 The measure’s only limitation is one that applies equally to all 
gerrymandering metrics: namely, that they are prone to large values (and large 
swings) when the number of districts is small.23 
And fourth, the efficiency gap corresponds closely to the empirical realities 
of U.S. elections. Over the last fifty years, congressional and state house plans 
have both had mean and median efficiency gaps near zero. As the parties’ vote 
shares have varied from year to year, their seat shares have also typically 
shifted to the precise extent necessary to maintain a low efficiency gap. 
These criteria are also why we have reservations about other measures of 
partisan gerrymandering. Partisan bias and the mean-median difference, for 
instance, often violate the efficiency principle. In many circumstances, if a 
party’s seat share changes while its vote share stays constant, the metrics either 
fail to move or move in the wrong direction. Additionally, partisan bias and 
the mean-median difference cannot be used in less competitive jurisdictions, 
 
 22. See id. at 11-15. 
 23. See infra Part III.B. 
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where one party wins more than about 55% of the statewide vote. In these 
settings, the hypothetical election that is explicit in partisan bias and implicit 
in the mean-median difference becomes too unrealistic. And the variants of the 
efficiency gap proposed by Cover and Nagle, while theoretically defensible, are 
empirically inconsistent with U.S. electoral history. They imply an ideal seat-
to-vote relationship of either one (i.e., proportional representation) or three 
(i.e., hyperresponsiveness). 
Despite these reservations, we wish to avoid the narcissism of small 
differences. One important point about the array of gerrymandering metrics 
that now exist is that no winner need be chosen among them. In other areas of 
election law, numerous measures happily coexist—for example, indices of 
population inequality, racial polarization, and geographic compactness. The 
same should be possible in the gerrymandering domain. 
Indeed, détente should be more achievable here because the various metrics 
are all linked mathematically to one another. The efficiency gap is equal to 
partisan bias whenever an election is tied statewide. The efficiency gap is also 
the same as the difference between the parties’ average margins of victory, as 
long as each margin is weighted by the number of seats won by the party. And 
partisan bias can be transformed into the mean-median difference by dividing 
it by the slope of the seat-vote curve (a plot that shows how a party’s seats and 
votes are related). 
Furthermore, all the measures produce similar results when jurisdictions 
are competitive statewide. These are the places where partisan gerrymandering 
can have the greatest impact, by turning the votes of an evenly split electorate 
into a state legislature or congressional delegation dominated by a single party. 
And in these places, it is largely immaterial which metric is consulted. Any of 
them will yield more or less the same conclusion. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe and justify the criteria 
we think should be used to evaluate measures of partisan gerrymandering. In 
Part II, we apply these criteria to the efficiency gap and show that it complies 
with them. In Part III, we respond to criticisms of the efficiency gap not already 
addressed: in particular, methodological objections by Cover and Nagle, claims 
about variability by Cho and by Krasno and colleagues, and the argument by 
Chambers and colleagues about ideology. And in Part IV, we discuss other 
gerrymandering metrics, both assessing them under our criteria and noting the 
extent of their convergence with the efficiency gap. 
I. Evaluative Criteria 
During the several decades in which partisan bias was the only measure of 
partisan gerrymandering used by scholars, there was no need to develop 
criteria for judging such metrics. With only one option on the table, there was 
nothing to choose between. Times have changed, though, as measures of 
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partisan gerrymandering have proliferated in recent years. Now there is some 
urgency to the project of determining how to gauge them properly. Otherwise 
scholars, litigants, and courts risk being inundated by metrics whose strengths 
and weaknesses are only hazily grasped. 
In this Part, we present a set of evaluative criteria that in our view reflect 
widely held intuitions about the character and quantification of partisan 
gerrymandering. These criteria seek (1) to capture the essence of the activity; 
(2) to distinguish it from other electoral concepts; (3) to promote ease of use; 
and (4) to avoid unnecessary disruption. We freely admit that other academics 
might tinker with this list based on their opinions about gerrymandering. But 
as long as the list is seen as suggestive rather than definitive, we hope it will not 
provoke too much controversy.24 
A. Efficiency 
Our first criterion is consistency with the efficiency principle. This 
principle states that a measure of partisan gerrymandering “must indicate a 
greater advantage for (against) a party when the seat share for that party 
increases (decreases) without any corresponding increase (decrease) in its vote 
share.”25 The principle would be violated, for example, if a party received 55% 
of the vote and 55% of the seats in one election, and 55% of the vote and 60% of 
the seats in another election, but a metric did not shift in the party’s favor. The 
principle would also be violated if a party’s vote share increased from 55% to 
60%, its seat share stayed constant at 55%, and a metric did not register a 
worsening in the party’s position. 
What is the basis for the efficiency principle? It is our understanding of 
partisan gerrymandering as a practice aimed above all at enabling a party to 
convert its votes into seats more efficiently than its adversary. Partisan 
gerrymandering, on this account, is fundamentally about the relationship 
between popular support and legislative representation—and manipulating this 
relationship to benefit one party and handicap its rival.26 
 
 24. For a more sweeping attempt to define generally the qualities of good social scientific 
concepts, see JOHN GERRING, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODOLOGY: A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK 
116-17 (2d ed. 5th prtg. 2014). For an argument that partisan symmetry (the concept 
underlying all measures of partisan gerrymandering) satisfies Gerring’s criteria, see 
Tom Ginsburg & Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Concepts of Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 
164-66 (2017). 
 25. McGhee, supra note 21, at 2; see also McGhee, supra note 5, at 61 (same). The corollary of 
the principle is that if a party’s vote share increases (decreases) without a corresponding 
increase (decrease) in the party’s seat share, a measure must indicate a greater disad-
vantage (advantage) for that party. 
 26. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 858-59. 
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This is not an idiosyncratic stance. It seems to be shared, rather, by many of 
the scholars who have devised gerrymandering metrics or criticized the 
efficiency gap.27 Andrew Gelman and Gary King, the best-known proponents 
of partisan bias, write that they seek to measure “the degree to which an 
electoral system unfairly favors one political party in the translation of 
statewide (or nationwide) votes into the partisan division of the legislature.”28 
Michael McDonald and Robin Best, two of the most prominent advocates of 
the mean-median difference, state that “[t]he fact of a gerrymander is evident 
when . . . one set of voters . . . cannot achieve majority status [in the legislature] 
with anything close to the same efficiency as the opposing set of voters.”29 And 
Cover argues that the key to gerrymandering is to “distort[] the way political 
parties translate popular support (votes) into governmental power (seats).”30 
To be clear, we do not assert that the efficiency principle is universally 
endorsed. Our more limited claim is that it is commonly considered to be the 
concept at the core of partisan gerrymandering.31 This, of course, is the view 
we hold as well. 
B. Distinctness 
Our second criterion is that a gerrymandering metric should capture 
efficiency and only efficiency. It should not try to gauge other electoral values, 
nor should it be (in part or in full) a function of those values. Here the values 
we have in mind are goals that redistricting plans may be able to promote or 
impede: electoral competitiveness (or how close races tend to be), proportional 
representation (or whether parties’ vote shares equal their seat shares), voter 
participation (or turnout), and so on. We consider a metric to be flawed to the 
extent it reflects these values in addition to, or instead of, efficiency. 
 
 27. See McGhee, supra note 5, at 57 (“Some version of efficiency is typically the core 
concept of interest in the literature on redistricting.”). 
 28. Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 543 (1994); see also Grofman & King, supra note 1, at 8 (“The key 
idea is that candidates of each political party should have equal opportunity in 
translating voter support into the division of legislative seats between the parties . . . .”). 
 29. McDonald & Best, supra note 12, at 318; see also Wang, Practical Tests, supra note 12, at 
370 (statement by another proponent of the mean-median difference that “[p]artisan 
gerrymandering creates a situation in which the same overall statewide vote share 
would lead to a very different level of representation for the redistricting party and its 
opposing target”). 
 30. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1143.  
 31. As Justice Souter once wrote, “[T]he usual point of gerrymandering . . . is to control the 
greatest number of seats . . . .” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 346 (2004) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
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This distinctness requirement has theoretical and doctrinal roots. Theoret-
ically, social scientists who study concept formation stress “[t]he importance of 
differentiation.”32 “A poorly bounded concept has definitional borders which 
overlap neighboring concepts.”33 “Such a concept is (ceteris paribus) less useful” 
because it cannot be reliably distinguished from adjacent ideas.34 
Doctrinally, the Supreme Court has made clear on a number of occasions 
that a measure of partisan gerrymandering must not take into account lack of 
competitiveness or deviation from proportional representation. In the 1973 
case Gaffney v. Cummings, the Court reviewed a bipartisan gerrymander 
composed mostly of “safe Democratic seats” and “safe Republican seats.”35 The 
Court upheld the plan, declaring that “judicial interest should be at its lowest 
ebb when a State purports fairly to allocate political power to the parties.”36 In 
all three of their direct confrontations with partisan gerrymandering claims,37 
several Justices also emphatically rejected disproportionality as a proper 
metric. “[T]he Constitution contains no such principle [of proportional 
representation],” the plurality observed in the 2004 case Vieth v. Jubelirer.38 “It 
nowhere says that farmers or urban dwellers, Christian fundamentalists or 
Jews, Republicans or Democrats, must be accorded political strength 
proportionate to their numbers.”39 
In the academy, scholars appear to be split as to whether a measure should 
incorporate values other than efficiency. For instance, Nagle writes with 
respect to efficiency and competitiveness that “it has been appropriately 
stressed that these are separate concepts.”40 Cho and Cover, on the other hand, 
argue for conflation. In Cover’s words, a gerrymandering metric “implicates . . . 
 
 32. See John Gerring, What Makes a Concept Good?: A Criterial Framework for Understanding 
Concept Formation in the Social Sciences, 31 POLITY 357, 375-79 (1999). 
 33. Id. at 376. 
 34. See id. at 378-79. 
 35. See 412 U.S. 735, 738 n.4 (1973). 
 36. See id. at 740-41, 754; see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130-31 (1986) (plurality 
opinion) (voicing no objection to “creating as many safe seats . . . as the . . . political 
characteristics of the State would permit” and thus “leav[ing] the minority in each safe 
district without a representative of its choice”), abrogated in part by Vieth, 541 U.S. 267. 
 37. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth, 541 
U.S. 267; Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109. 
 38. 541 U.S. at 288 (plurality opinion); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419 (opinion of Kennedy, 
J.) (“[T]here is no constitutional requirement of proportional representation . . . .”); 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion) (“Our cases . . . clearly foreclose any claim 
that the Constitution requires proportional representation . . . .”). 
 39. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288 (plurality opinion). 
 40. See Nagle, supra note 14, at 347; see also McGann et al., supra note 14, at 296 n.1 (noting 
that partisan bias “was a major advance” because “it separates symmetry/bias . . . from 
responsiveness”). 
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multiple democratic norms—including electoral competition, voter 
participation, majoritarianism, minority protection, and partisan fairness.”41 
We take Nagle’s side in this dispute. We do so in part for the reasons 
alluded to above: As a matter of concept formation, differentiation is preferable 
to amalgamation, and as a doctrinal matter, a metric loses its appeal to the 
degree it is based on lack of competitiveness or on disproportionality. We also 
agree with Nagle for a more practical reason: We simply do not see how one 
measure could possibly encompass efficiency, competitiveness, participation, 
minority representation, and so on. These values are all conceptually and 
empirically distinct, so there is no way to combine them into a single über-
metric. 
C. Scope 
Our third criterion is that a measure of partisan gerrymandering should be 
applicable to a wide range of electoral conditions. It should be possible to 
calculate a metric (and for the results of the computation to be meaningful) 
whether elections are competitive statewide or one party dominates the 
statewide vote; whether turnout is roughly equal or varies sharply from 
district to district; and whether two parties are competing or a multiparty 
environment exists. 
Our rationale for this requirement is usefulness. The norm in most states 
may be for the two major parties to be relatively evenly matched, for no other 
parties to be electorally relevant, and for turnout to differ only modestly from 
district to district (at least since the advent of one person, one vote). But this 
norm is far from universally satisfied. At the congressional level, for example, 
one party won more than 55% of the statewide vote in close to half of the 
elections from 1972 to 2016.42 And in these elections, the average difference 
between the highest- and the lowest-turnout districts in each state was more 
 
 41. Cover, supra note 15, at 1144; see also Cho, supra note 18, at 32 (“[A] measure of partisan 
fairness should be able to distinguish maps with non-competitive districts that are not 
responsive to voters from a map that is comprised of competitive districts that are 
responsive to the voters.”). 
 42. We calculated this figure using the database assembled by Simon Jackman in the North 
Carolina partisan gerrymandering litigation. This database includes 512 observations 
from 136 redistricting plans and 25 states (all with at least 7 congressional seats), 
spanning elections from 1972 to 2016. See Assessing the Current North Carolina 
Congressional Districting Plan: Amended Report, Simon Jackman, at 9, 18-19, 
Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01026-WO-
JEP), 2017 WL 3840612 [hereinafter Jackman North Carolina Report]; see also 
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 861 (reporting a similar figure for state 
legislative elections). 
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than 100,000 voters.43 “Atypical” electoral scenarios are thus not all that 
uncommon, and a gerrymandering metric should not be foiled by them. 
We are unaware of any dissent from the general proposition that breadth 
of scope is a desirable attribute for a gerrymandering metric. A few scholars 
argue, however, that a measure need only be applicable to competitive 
jurisdictions, where the major parties enjoy similar levels of statewide 
support.44 We disagree. It is only in these jurisdictions that control of the 
legislature is realistically at stake. But gerrymandering is harmful even when it 
does not produce a legislative majority for a party that receives a minority of 
the statewide vote. If the practice converts a strong statewide performance into 
an overwhelming legislative supermajority—or if it does the reverse, barely 
allowing a very popular party to retain a legislative majority—it still inflicts 
democratic injuries we think a metric should be able to detect. Legislative 
control does not exhaust our notion of legislative clout.45 
At the congressional level, moreover, it is obvious that gerrymandering 
can affect the national balance of power whether or not a state is competitive. 
An extra seat is an extra seat in the House of Representatives, whether it comes 
from a red, blue, or purple state. A measure that is valid only in swing states 
would thus miss a large part of the picture—and, indeed, might distort it by 
ignoring redistricting dynamics in safe states.46 
D. Correspondence 
Our fourth and final criterion is that a measure of partisan gerrymander-
ing should be broadly consistent with the empirical realities of U.S. elections. 
Every metric implies a certain electoral ideal: a perfect score (usually zero) 
indicating that neither major party is benefited or handicapped by a 
redistricting plan. This ideal should be one that maps have actually achieved 
with some regularity in prior elections. It should not be an aspiration that 
plans have almost always failed to realize. 
We include this requirement primarily for the sake of practicality. Courts 
are unlikely to embrace a measure if it suggests that most challenged maps are 
 
 43. According to our calculations, the average standard deviation of district turnout in these 
elections was about 30,000 voters. Both this figure and that in the main text take into 
account imputations for uncontested seats. See infra text accompanying notes 121-23. 
 44. See, e.g., Grofman & King, supra note 1, at 18-19; see also id. at 31 (“[T]he concept of partisan 
symmetry is only appropriate for competitive situations where there is a potential for a 
change in partisan outcomes (majority control, in particular) . . . .”); McDonald & Best, 
supra note 12, at 319 (“For a packing gerrymander to rise to the level of an ascertainable 
constitutional offense a jurisdiction has to be politically competitive.”). 
 45. For our original formulation of this argument, see Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra 
note 5, at 861. 
 46. See id. 
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(and most maps historically have been) impermissible partisan gerrymanders.47 
Likewise, line-drawers probably have little use for a metric that condemns 
most of their efforts—including plans designed without partisan intent, or 
perhaps even with the aim of partisan fairness.48 Conceptually as well, a 
measure that is inconsistent with U.S. electoral history may be inapplicable to 
the single-member-district plans employed by most U.S. jurisdictions. The 
inconsistency may arise because the metric is only valid for other electoral 
systems.49 
Nagle is the lone scholar who seems to have thought about empirical 
correspondence. He observes that different measures of gerrymandering imply 
different ideal relationships between parties’ vote shares and seat shares.50 To 
choose between the metrics, “it appears that the best one can do is to appeal to 
the empirical result” of how seats and votes have, in fact, been linked in 
previous elections.51 We concur, though we would not put the point quite so 
strongly. In our view, the empirical record should be a (not the dispositive) 
factor in selecting a measure. 
II. Evaluating the Efficiency Gap 
How does the efficiency gap fare under these criteria? Quite well, as we 
show in this Part. It is always consistent with the efficiency principle; it is 
distinct from other electoral values; it can be meaningfully calculated in almost 
any electoral environment; and it is highly congruent with U.S. electoral 
history. 
A few notes before beginning our evaluation: First, in the course of 
assessing the efficiency gap, we also respond to a number of critiques of the 
metric. We address remaining objections in Part III below. Second, where 
 
 47. Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(warning against legal theories that “would commit federal and state courts to 
unprecedented intervention in the American political process”). 
 48. Cf. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016) (rejecting an approach to 
apportionment that “would upset a well-functioning approach to districting that all 50 
States and countless local jurisdictions have followed for decades”). 
 49. It is true, of course, that previous interventions by the Court have embraced electoral 
ideals (like one person, one vote and the absence of racial vote dilution) that historical-
ly were violated by many plans. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); cf. 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986). But the current Court does not seem to 
have any appetite for another reapportionment revolution: that is, for a partisan 
gerrymandering standard that would “throw into doubt the vast majority of the 
Nation’s . . . congressional districts,” cf. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 50. See Nagle, supra note 15, at 204. 
 51. See id. 
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possible, we support our arguments with data. It is our strongly held stance 
that measures of partisan gerrymandering cannot be gauged productively in 
the abstract. And third, we refrain from commenting here on other 
gerrymandering metrics. In the next two Parts, though, we apply our criteria 
to partisan bias, the mean-median difference, and the difference between 
parties’ average margins of victory. 
A. Efficiency 
It is not terribly surprising that the efficiency principle is satisfied by a 
metric called the efficiency gap. Still, it is worth unpacking the logic of why the 
efficiency gap always moves in the correct direction when a party wins a larger 
seat share with the same vote share. For a party’s seat share to increase while its 
vote share stays constant, the distribution of the party’s votes across the 
districts in the plan must change. Specifically, the party must receive more 
votes than the opposition in at least one district where the opposition 
previously received more votes. These additional votes must be deducted from 
the party’s votes in other districts (because its overall vote share is fixed). This 
can be achieved either by reducing the party’s margin of victory in districts it 
was already winning or by increasing its margin of defeat in districts it was 
already losing. Either way, the party wastes fewer votes in these districts than 
it did before, while winning at least one new district. The efficiency gap, which 
simply compares the parties’ respective wasted votes, necessarily shifts in the 
party’s favor. 
Table 1 below makes this point with a simple ten-district example (to 
which we return in Part IV below). In both elections, party A receives 55% of 
the vote. But in the first election party A wins 6 out of 10 seats, while in the 
second election it wins 7 out of 10. Consistent with the efficiency principle, the 
efficiency gap goes from 0% in the first election to 10% in party A’s direction in 
the second election.  
What accounts for this shift? In the district that flips from party B to  
party A (District 7), the allocation of wasted votes swings dramatically: from 44 
wasted A votes and 6 wasted B votes in the first election to 3 wasted A votes and 
47 wasted B votes in the second election. In the three other districts in which 
the vote distribution changes, the allocation of wasted votes differs only 
modestly. Districts 2 and 3 each have 23 wasted A votes and 27 wasted B votes 
in the first election, and 20 wasted A votes and 30 wasted B votes in the second 
election. And District 9 has 44 wasted A votes and 6 wasted B votes in the first 
election, and 41 wasted A votes and 9 wasted B votes in the second election. All 
of these changes benefit party A and lead to its wasting just 200 votes in the 
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second election compared to 250 in the first one. Party B, in contrast, sees its 
wasted votes rise from 250 to 300.52 
Table 1 
Efficiency Gap Examples 
District 
Election 1 Election 2 
Votes Wasted Votes Votes Wasted Votes 
Party 
A 
Party 
B 
Party 
A 
Party 
B 
Party 
A 
Party 
B 
Party 
A 
Party 
B 
1 73 27 23 27 73 27 23 27 
2 73 27 23 27 70 30 20 30 
3 73 27 23 27 70 30 20 30 
4 53 47 3 47 53 47 3 47 
5 53 47 3 47 53 47 3 47 
6 53 47 3 47 53 47 3 47 
7 44 56 44 6 53 47 3 47 
8 44 56 44 6 44 56 44 6 
9 44 56 44 6 41 59 41 9 
10 40 60 40 10 40 60 40 10 
Totals 550 450 250 250 550 450 200 300 
EG (250 – 250) / 1000 = 0% (300 – 200) / 1000 = 10% 
Votes and wasted votes by district in two elections under the same ten-district 
plan. The efficiency gap (EG) is calculated using the full method discussed in  
notes 87-88 and accompanying text below. The boxed districts are those in which 
the vote distribution changes between the two elections. 
 
Any single example, of course, may be misleading. To allay this concern, 
one of us used a computer program to simulate 5100 district plans, 100 for each 
possible value of statewide vote share (in one-point increments) between 25% 
and 75%.53 Each of these plans had 100 districts whose turnout was allowed to 
vary by up to a factor of 15.54 Each plan also included a third party that 
received from 0% to 20% of the statewide vote.55 
 
 52. For ease of calculation, we assume that 50 votes are needed to win a district, not 51. 
Using 51 votes as the threshold instead, the efficiency gap is 0.2% in the first election 
and 10.4% in the second election (both times in favor of party A).  
 53. See McGhee, supra note 21, at 8. 
 54. See id. at 8, 16. 
 55. See id. at 16 (allowing for five different possible vote shares for the third party: 0%, 5%, 
10%, 15%, or 20%). 
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Figure 1 below displays the results of these simulations. The x-axis in each 
chart represents the vote share of the “benchmark” party (simply one of the 
two major parties). The y-axis indicates the proportion of the plans (paired in 
every possible permutation) that violate the efficiency principle. The black 
points assume equal turnout in each district while the gray points permit 
differential turnout. The five rows correspond to different vote shares for the 
third party. And of the four columns, only the leftmost one, representing the 
original version of the efficiency gap, is of interest here.56 (The other three 
denote variants of the efficiency gap that we discuss in Part III below.) 
It is immediately evident that the efficiency gap never violates the efficien-
cy principle in any of the simulations. The plot for the efficiency gap remains 
flat at zero no matter what vote share the benchmark party or the third party 
receives and regardless whether turnout is equal or varies from district to 
district. This is powerful confirmation that there is nothing idiosyncratic 
about the ten-district example we presented above. As far as we can tell, the 
efficiency gap always complies with the efficiency principle, in every electoral 
setting.  
 
 56. Both here and whenever district turnout is not assumed to be equal, we use the form of 
the efficiency gap presented in McGhee’s 2017 article. See id. at 11-12 (presenting 
equation 4). 
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Figure 1 
Efficiency Gap Simulations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The charts plot the proportion of simulated plans that violate the efficiency 
principle, under varying electoral circumstances, for the original efficiency gap 
and three of its variants. The x-axis represents the vote share of the benchmark 
party. The black points represent simulations assuming equal turnout in each 
district while the simulations represented by gray points permit differential 
turnout. The five rows correspond to different vote shares for the third party. 
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B. Distinctness 
Turning to our distinctness criterion, Cover argues that the efficiency gap 
is not distinct from electoral competitiveness, proportional representation, or 
voter participation. In his view, the measure promotes uncompetitive 
elections, deters plans that award seats in proportion to votes, and fosters voter 
suppression. We respond to these claims in turn. 
With respect to competitiveness, Cover’s reasoning is as follows: At the 
level of an individual district, the parties’ wasted votes are equal when the vote 
is split 75% to 25%. (Each party wastes 25% of the vote in this case.) Therefore a 
plan made up exclusively of 75%-to-25% districts would necessarily feature 
equal wasted votes for each party, and hence an efficiency gap of zero.57 But 
75%-to-25% districts are highly uncompetitive, with a whopping margin of 
victory of 50%. 
Cover himself identifies the fatal flaw in this logic: While a plan made up 
exclusively of 75%-to-25% districts has an efficiency gap of zero, so do countless 
other plans, many of which are competitive. As Cover puts it, the “simple zero-gap 
plan” composed entirely of 75%-to-25% districts “is not the only zero-gap 
plan.”58 Rather, “[A] plan can achieve an efficiency gap of zero even if it 
exhibits nonzero district-level wasted vote disparities . . . .”59 In other words, 
there is no necessary relationship between the efficiency gap and the average 
margin of victory under a plan. Any efficiency gap is compatible with any 
average margin of victory.  
Cover has two rejoinders to his own rebuttal. One is that “each zero-gap 
plan can be converted to (and from) a simple zero-gap plan” composed entirely 
of 75%-to-25% districts “by performing the appropriate series of voter swaps.”60 
This observation does not establish a connection between the efficiency gap 
and competitiveness. That a competitive zero-gap plan can, in principle, be 
redrawn into an uncompetitive zero-gap plan does not render the former any 
less competitive. (Nor, in reverse, is an uncompetitive zero-gap plan any more 
competitive just because, theoretically, it can be reshaped into a competitive 
zero-gap plan.) 
 
 57. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1201 (“Given that a party can win a single seat with 75% of 
the votes in a zero-disparity district, a party can win all the seats with 75% of votes and 
an efficiency gap of zero.”). 
 58. See id. at 1179. 
 59. Id.  
 60. See id. 
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Cover’s other point is that of the universe of zero-gap plans, only uncom-
petitive ones “can maintain a zero (or low) gap over a range of vote share.”61 
This is incorrect. Take a “simple zero-gap plan” made up exclusively of 75%-to-
25% districts.62 This plan’s efficiency gap is guaranteed not to remain low if the 
statewide vote shifts substantially in either party’s favor. This is because none 
of the plan’s (very safe) seats would flip, meaning that the parties’ wasted votes 
would become increasingly unequal as the electoral environment evolved. 
Indeed, the only kind of plan whose efficiency gap would stay low in the face of 
significant input variation is a reasonably (though not maximally) competitive 
one.63 In such a plan, enough districts would change hands as the statewide vote 
shifted to keep the parties’ wasted votes in rough equilibrium.64 
We mentioned earlier that we are partial to data-driven analysis when 
evaluating measures of partisan gerrymandering. In this spirit, Figure 2 below 
shows how the efficiency gap and electoral competitiveness have been linked in 
state house and congressional elections from 1972 to the mid-2010s.65 The top 
chart is for state house elections (which we consider more informative due to 
their larger numbers of districts); the bottom chart is for congressional elections. 
The x-axis in each chart represents the average margin of victory across all of a 
state’s districts in a given year—a standard gauge of competitiveness.66 The y-axis 
in each chart represents the absolute value of the efficiency gap.67 
 
 61. Id. at 1210 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 1211 (focusing this critique on “highly 
uncompetitive plan[s]”); id. at 1212 (noting that “only 2 of 10 districts are relatively 
competitive” in a durably zero-gap plan). 
 62. See id. at 1178-79. 
 63. Specifically, as discussed below, a plan with enough competitive districts to yield a seat-
vote responsiveness of 2 would maintain a given efficiency gap as the statewide vote 
shifted back and forth. This is the responsiveness that U.S. elections have historically 
exhibited. See infra Part II.D.  
 64. Cover essentially concedes this point. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1211-12.  
 65. The state house database was assembled by Jackman in the Wisconsin partisan 
gerrymandering litigation. It includes 786 observations from 206 redistricting plans 
and 41 states spanning elections from 1972 to 2014. See Assessing the Current Wiscon-
sin State Legislative Districting Plan, Simon Jackman, at 3-6, Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 
837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc), 2015 WL 10091020 [hereinafter Jackman 
Wisconsin Report]. 
 66. See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, 3 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 669, 685 (2013). 
 67. We use the simplified form of the efficiency gap in the state house chart (because the 
data needed to calculate the full form is unavailable at this electoral level) and the full 
form in the congressional chart. See generally infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text 
(defining the two methods of calculation). 
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Figure 2 
Electoral Competitiveness and the Efficiency Gap 
State Houses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Congressional Delegations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plots of the absolute value of the efficiency gap versus the average margin 
of victory in an election for state houses and congressional delegations from 1972 
to the mid-2010s. 
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At the state house level, there is plainly no meaningful relationship 
between electoral competitiveness and the magnitude of the efficiency gap. 
How close races tend to be tells us nothing about the size of a plan’s partisan 
skew. At the congressional level, there is a negative correlation, but it is quite 
weak.68 In fact, the average margin of victory accounts for only about 6% of the 
variation in the absolute value of the efficiency gap. The average margin of 
victory also fails to attain statistical significance when it is added to a causal 
model one of us has constructed for the efficiency gap.69 We think these 
findings dovetail nicely with the conceptual position we outlined above. In 
theory, any efficiency gap may coincide with any average margin of victory—
and in practice, too, these variables are virtually unrelated.70 
Next, with respect to proportional representation, Cover’s objection is that 
it is not equivalent to the efficiency gap.71 Because the concepts are distinct, a 
plan may “achiev[e] the ideal of equal wasted votes at the expense of . . . seats-
votes proportionality.”72 Likewise, “[a] plan that produces rough proportionali-
ty” may also “produce a large efficiency gap.”73 
In our opinion, these possibilities are a feature of the efficiency gap, not a 
bug. Recall that several of the Justices have disavowed disproportionality, in no 
uncertain terms, as an appropriate standard in partisan gerrymandering 
 
 68. The scatter plot suggests that the negative relationship is driven by a small number of 
competitive plans with large efficiency gaps. 
 69. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Causes and Consequences of Gerrymandering, 59 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 24 tbl.2), https://perma.cc/3WT8 
-TKFU (presenting a regression model that predicts efficiency gaps based on the 
institution responsible for redistricting, minority representation, urbanization, and 
other variables). 
 70. For a finding (albeit based on simulated rather than historical plans) that the efficiency 
gap and competitiveness are distinct, see Bruce E. Cain et al., A Reasonable Bias Approach 
to Gerrymandering: Using Automated Plan Generation to Evaluate Redistricting Proposals, 59 
WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 12-14), https://perma.cc 
/AVE3-5PRJ (showing “only some overlap” between the efficiency gap and competi-
tiveness and concluding that “[w]hile [both] of these ideas are embedded into the 
concept of political fairness, they are also, in many cases, distinct”). 
 71. The reason why disproportionality is not equivalent to the efficiency gap is that the 
former measures a plan’s deviation from a 1-to-1 seat-to-vote relationship, while a 2-
to-1 seat-to-vote relationship is necessary to maintain an efficiency gap of zero (or any 
other value). See infra Part II.D. Thus in the first election in Table 1 above, in which 
party A wins 55% of the vote and 60% of the seats, disproportionality is 5% (60% – 55%) 
while the efficiency gap is zero (because party A turns a 10% advantage in votes into a 
20% advantage in seats).  
 72. Cover, supra note 15, at 1213. 
 73. Id. Cover incorrectly claims that a proportional plan “necessarily” yields a large 
efficiency gap. Id. Near the 50-50 point, a plan can easily be proportional with a small 
efficiency gap. 
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cases.74 Accordingly, any metric that is synonymous with disproportionality is 
almost certainly precluded from judicial consideration. It is thus the efficiency 
gap’s lack of overlap with disproportionality that explains why judges have 
been willing to entertain it. If the efficiency gap always led to the same results 
as disproportionality, it would not have made it through the courthouse 
door.75 
There is another doctrinal problem with Cover’s argument. If a jurisdic-
tion intentionally enacted a redistricting plan that achieved proportionality—
but that also exhibited a large efficiency gap—this jurisdiction would be 
insulated from liability. After all, no one has proposed that maps be struck 
down whenever their efficiency gaps exceed a certain threshold. Rather, the 
only test on the table requires a large and durable efficiency gap and the 
presence of discriminatory intent and the absence of any legitimate 
justification before a plan is invalidated.76 Under this test, the jurisdiction that 
aimed for proportionality would not have harbored any illicit intent.77 There 
would also be a compelling justification for the map’s large efficiency gap: 
namely, the jurisdiction’s pursuit of proportionality. 
Practically as well, Cover’s argument is quite limited in its scope. U.S. states 
rarely try to achieve proportionality when they draw district lines. In fact, not 
a single state (nor, as far as we know, a single other government in the United 
States) lists proportional representation as a statutory or constitutional 
redistricting criterion.78 Additionally, as we discuss below, the single-member-
district plans used by most U.S. jurisdictions do not typically yield proportion-
al outcomes.79 This is because most of these plans include a substantial number 
 
 74. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. 
 75. See Whitford v. Nichol, 151 F. Supp. 3d 918, 929-30 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (denying the state’s 
motion to dismiss precisely because “an election’s results may have a small efficiency 
gap without being proportional or they may be proportional and still have a large 
efficiency gap”). 
 76. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 883-927 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (describing and 
analyzing the three prongs of the plaintiffs’ proposed test), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289, 
and jurisdiction postponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017). 
 77. See id. at 910 (“[D]rafters who had the intent to create a proportional system hardly 
could be accused of harboring a discriminatory intent.”). 
 78. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010 app. E at 172-
217 (2009) (listing all fifty states’ redistricting criteria). A handful of municipalities use 
different electoral systems that ensure proportional representation, but this is plainly 
not the same as trying to achieve proportionality in a single-member-district system. 
Ohio has adopted a proportionality requirement for legislative districts that will take 
effect in 2021. See Redistricting Criteria, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/9UCN-VYK6. 
 79. See infra Part II.D; see also Grofman & King, supra note 1, at 6 n.30 (“[I]t is widely 
recognized that a proportionality standard is simply not appropriate for use as a legal 
footnote continued on next page 
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of competitive districts. As the parties’ fortunes ebb and flow, these districts 
tend to change hands too rapidly to maintain the 1-to-1 seat-to-vote 
relationship required for proportionality. 
The last electoral value Cover links to the efficiency gap is voter participa-
tion. He claims that if the efficiency gap were incorporated into a legal test for 
partisan gerrymandering, this would “reward, and thereby further incentivize, 
voter suppression efforts.”80 Why? Because restrictive electoral rules, if they 
disproportionately affect the gerrymandered party’s supporters, increase the 
vote share of the gerrymandering party. All else being equal, a larger vote share 
for a party produces a smaller efficiency gap in favor of this party because it 
now wastes more votes in both the districts it wins (by wider margins) and 
those it loses (by narrower margins). A smaller efficiency gap, in turn, would 
reduce the party’s exposure to gerrymandering liability.81 
We highly doubt the plausibility of this causal chain. Over the last dec-
ade—before the efficiency gap was even invented, let alone invoked in 
lawsuits—many states adopted restrictive electoral rules.82 They did so for the 
obvious reason that a larger vote share is valuable to parties in and of itself, even 
if it does not affect the odds that the parties will be found liable for 
gerrymandering. For Cover’s contention to have any bite, there would have to 
exist parties that would not engage in voter suppression efforts if the efficiency 
gap excluded from the test for partisan gerrymandering but that would carry 
them out if the efficiency gap were included in the doctrine. Such parties—so 
attuned to benefits in litigation but so oblivious to ordinary political 
advantages—strike us as unicorns the world has never seen. 
Moreover, even if one of these odd creatures could be located, its efforts 
might very well backfire. Figure 3 below plots the efficiency gap (on the y-axis) 
versus the Democratic share of the statewide vote (on the x-axis) for state house 
elections (top chart) and congressional elections (bottom chart) since 1972.83 At 
both electoral levels, there is a modest but unmistakable positive relationship 
between these variables. Thus as Democrats increase their vote share (through 
the suppression of Republican voters or other means), the efficiency gap tends 
to suggest more, not less, of a Democratic advantage. Similarly, as Republicans 
 
standard in plurality based elections, since plurality elections cannot be expected to 
yield proportional results.”). 
 80. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1189. 
 81. See id. (“Suppressing one party’s statewide vote total can have the effect of reducing the 
overall gap.”). 
 82. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice, New Voting Restrictions in America 2-11 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/8BDU-GKAC (tracking the adoption of voting restrictions and 
finding that as of May 2017 twenty states had enacted at least one type of restriction). 
 83. Positive efficiency gap scores are pro-Democratic; negative scores are pro-Republican. 
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win a larger share of the vote, the efficiency gap again shifts toward rather 
than against them. 
How can this be, given the statement above that all else being equal, a 
larger vote share for a party produces a smaller efficiency gap in favor of this 
party? Because all else is not equal. Rather, when a party increases its vote share, 
it typically wins more seats too. And it typically wins so many more seats that 
the efficiency gap moves in its direction notwithstanding the extra votes it 
wastes in other districts. A party that curbed its opponents’ voting in order to 
avoid gerrymandering liability, then, could easily find itself in a more 
precarious position. Its plan’s efficiency gap could well become larger, placing 
the map on thinner legal ice.  
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Figure 3 
Statewide Party Performance and the Efficiency Gap 
State Houses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Congressional Delegations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plots of the efficiency gap versus the Democratic share of the statewide 
vote for state house and congressional elections from 1972 to the mid-2010s. 
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C. Scope 
Shifting gears from distinctness to breadth of scope, a nice feature of the 
efficiency gap is that it can be calculated—meaningfully—no matter how 
competitive or uncompetitive a jurisdiction happens to be. Whether the 
parties are evenly matched or one party predominates in a state, the parties’ 
respective wasted votes can be tallied and compared.84 Cho and Cover each 
point out that when a party receives 75% or more of the statewide vote, the 
efficiency gap can be minimized only if that party wins all of the seats.85 But 
this is not actually a troublesome result. In principle, we would expect it to be 
quite difficult for a small minority party to muster a districtwide majority 
given the electorate’s overwhelming support for the opposing party. And 
empirically, in both of the elections in our databases in which a party received 
at least 75% of the statewide vote, it indeed won every seat.86 
Another appealing attribute of the efficiency gap is that it can be computed 
if turnout is assumed to be equal or if turnout varies from district to district. If 
turnout is assumed to be equal, the simplified form of the efficiency gap can be 
used: EG = (S – 0.5) – 2 * (V – 0.5), where S is a party’s statewide seat share and V 
is the party’s vote share averaged across all districts.87 To take into account 
district-level variations in turnout, the full form of the efficiency gap must be 
used instead. Under this method, the parties’ respective wasted votes are 
counted (district by district) and then totaled. Next, one of these sums is 
subtracted from the other, and the difference is divided by the total number of 
votes cast in the state.88 
Citing just a single congressional election, Cover worries about the 
potential divergence between the two techniques.89 Figure 4 below supplies the 
 
 84. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 855. 
 85. See Cho, supra note 18, at 21-22; Cover, supra note 15, at 1201 (“When one party earns 
75% of the votes, the simple minimizing plan accords that party all the seats . . . .”). We 
first noted this implication ourselves. See McGhee, supra note 5, at 70; Stephanopoulos 
& McGhee, supra note 5, at 863. 
 86. It is revealing, of course, that out of the nearly 1300 cases in our databases, only two 
feature a statewide vote share above 75%: In 1974, Alabama Democrats won 75.6% of the 
state house vote along with all 105 state house seats; in 2006, Massachusetts Democrats 
won 75.0% of the congressional vote along with all 10 congressional seats. The scenario 
to which Cho and Cover object is thus vanishingly rare. For more information on the 
databases on which we rely, see notes 42, 65 above. 
 87. See McGhee, supra note 5, at 68-70; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 850-53. 
The reason to use the simplified form of the efficiency gap is that sometimes only vote 
shares (not raw vote totals) are available by district. In such cases, the full form cannot 
be employed. 
 88. See McGhee, supra note 5, at 68. As noted above, whenever we use the full form of the 
efficiency gap in this Essay, we include the adjustment described in McGhee’s 2017 
article. See McGhee, supra note 21, at 11-12; supra note 56.  
 89. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1176. 
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comprehensive data that is missing from Cover’s critique. It plots the full form 
of the efficiency gap (on the y-axis) versus the simplified form of the efficiency 
gap (on the x-axis) for congressional elections since 1972. (We do not include an 
analogous chart for state house elections because we do not currently have the 
data necessary for the full-form calculations at this electoral level.) It is obvious 
from the scatter plot that the two forms of the efficiency gap are very closely 
linked. The points hug the best-fit line, and the correlation between the two 
methods is an impressive 0.97.90 There is thus little chance that one’s 
substantive conclusions would change based on the technique one used to 
calculate the efficiency gap. Turnout does vary from district to district, of 
course, but it does not vary much between districts won by one party and 
districts won by the other. As Cover observes, it is only such differential 
partisan turnout that would drive a wedge between the two forms of the 
efficiency gap.91 
Figure 4 
The Full Form and the Simplified Form of the Efficiency Gap 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plot of the efficiency gap calculated using the full form versus the 
efficiency gap calculated using the simplified form, for congressional elections 
from 1972 to 2016. 
 
 
 90. The cases farthest from the best-fit line are concentrated in New York, which has 
numerous low-turnout districts that are almost always won by Democrats. 
 91. For more on what Cover calls the “turnout gap,” see Cover, supra note 15, at 1170-77. 
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The last electoral setting in which the efficiency gap is applicable is the 
multiparty context. One of us recently showed how the measure can be 
calculated when there are more than two parties competing for office.92 We do 
not repeat the technical details here, but rather highlight three points. First, the 
efficiency gap is always computed in pairwise fashion—that is, for two focal 
parties at a time while combining all the seats and votes won by other parties.93 
These two focal parties can be the two major parties, a major party and a minor 
party, or two minor parties.94  
Second, when using the full method for more than two parties, a party can 
have positive or negative wasted votes when it wins a district. As in the two-
party case, a party’s wasted votes are positive when it receives more than 50% 
of the district vote. But a party’s wasted votes are negative (or beneficial to it) 
when it receives less than 50% of the district vote but nevertheless prevails 
because of how the remaining vote is split among its opponents.95 
And third, the simplified form of the efficiency gap in the multiparty 
context is EG = (SA – 0.5) – 2 * (VA – 0.5) – VC + 0.5 * SC, where SA is one focal 
party’s statewide seat share, VA is that party’s statewide vote share, VC is the 
combined statewide vote share of all nonfocal parties, and SC is the combined 
statewide seat share of all nonfocal parties.96 Suppose, for example, that party A 
wins 45% of the vote and 55% of the seats, that party B wins 40% of the vote and 
40% of the seats, and that all other parties win, collectively, 15% of the vote and 
5% of the seats. Then the efficiency gap for party A relative to party B is: 
(0.55 – 0.5) – 2 * (0.45 – 0.5) – 0.15 + 0.5 * 0.05 = 0.025 (or 2.5%) in favor of party A. 
D. Correspondence 
Our final criterion is empirical correspondence with U.S. electoral history. 
One way to assess the efficiency gap’s correspondence is to examine its 
distribution over a long period of time. If the distribution is normal and 
centered at zero, this would indicate that many plans historically have 
managed to score well on the measure. Conversely, if the distribution is skewed 
and there are few values near zero, this would suggest that a low efficiency gap 
is an unrealistic aspiration for many U.S. jurisdictions. 
 
 92. See McGhee, supra note 21, at 13-15. 
 93. See id. at 14 (“[T]his new efficiency gap is equal to the original efficiency gap, minus the 
total wasted votes of the remaining parties that are not compared in the calculation.”). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. Imagine, for example, that in a three-way race a party wins a district 40% to 30% 
to 30%. Then the party has –10% wasted votes because it won the district with ten 
percentage points fewer votes than were necessary to guarantee victory. 
 96. See id. at 13-14, 14 n.20. 
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Figure 5 below presents two kernel density curves (or smoothed versions 
of histograms): on the top, for the efficiency gap in state house elections from 
1972 to 2014, and on the bottom, for the efficiency gap in congressional 
elections over this span.97 Both curves are classic normal distributions with 
means and medians very close to zero. In other words, over nearly half a 
century, most plans have not significantly benefited (or handicapped) either 
party, and there has been no overall skew in either party’s direction.98 We 
think this is strong evidence in favor of the efficiency gap’s empirical 
correspondence. The metric does not expect the impossible of U.S. jurisdic-
tions; rather, it is highly consistent with their actual electoral outcomes over 
many years. 
 
 97. For a discussion of similar density curves, see Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, 
at 868-69, 870 fig.4. 
 98. A few plans, of course, have been highly asymmetric. These are the ones in the tails of 
the distributions. 
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Figure 5 
Efficiency Gap Density Curves 
State Houses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Congressional Delegations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kernel density curves (smoothed histograms) showing historical values of the 
efficiency gap for state houses and congressional delegations from 1972 to the 
mid-2010s. 
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Another test for the efficiency gap is whether its implied seat-to-vote 
relationship resembles the one in fact exhibited by U.S. elections. Using either 
the full or the simplified method, the efficiency gap stays constant (at zero or 
any other value) only if a party’s seat share changes at twice the rate of its vote 
share.99 It would therefore be encouraging if seats and votes have been linked 
in roughly a 2-to-1 ratio in prior U.S. elections. And it would be concerning if 
historical responsiveness has diverged markedly from 2. 
Figure 6 below plots the Democratic share of statewide seats (on the y-axis) 
versus the Democratic share of the statewide vote (on the x-axis) for state house 
elections (top chart) and congressional elections (bottom chart) since 1972. The 
charts also include a seat-vote line with a slope of 2. In both cases, the points 
cluster quite tightly around this line. The fit is not perfect—at both electoral 
levels, historical responsiveness has been slightly higher than 2—but it is still 
very good.100 In our view, this is further confirmation of the efficiency gap’s 
empirical correspondence. Not only have most elections produced efficiency 
gaps close to zero, but when seats and votes have changed from year to year, 
they have done so at just about the right rate to maintain a low efficiency gap. 
 
 99. See McGhee, supra note 5, at 69; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 854. 
 100. For additional findings that responsiveness at the congressional level has historically 
been close to 2, see Goedert, Gerrymandering or Geography?, supra note 15, at 2-3 (finding 
that between 1972 and 2012 “a 1% increase in vote share [produced] about a 2% increase 
in seat share”); and Edward R. Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-
Party Systems, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 540, 540-42 (1973) (finding a responsiveness of 1.9 
over twelve congressional elections). 
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Figure 6 
Parties’ Seat Shares and Vote Shares 
State Houses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Congressional Delegations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plots of the Democratic share of statewide seats versus the Democratic 
share of the statewide vote for state house and congressional elections from 1972 
to the mid-2010s. A seat-vote line with a slope of 2 is included in each chart. 
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III. Critiques of the Efficiency Gap 
We responded to several critiques of the efficiency gap in the previous Part 
while discussing its compliance with our criteria for measures of partisan 
gerrymandering. But we did not address three further sets of objections. The 
first involves the methodological choices underpinning the efficiency gap: in 
particular, how wasted votes are defined and weighted, and how imputations 
are made for uncontested races. The second relates to the metric’s variability, 
both in hypothetical examples of one or two districts and in actual district 
plans. And the third stems from the efficiency gap’s conflation of all legislators 
affiliated with a given party, regardless of their ideologies. 
As to methodology, we agree that our approach is not the only reasonable 
way to treat wasted votes. The trouble with other positions, though, is that 
they result in violations of the efficiency principle or a lack of correspondence 
with U.S. electoral history. As to variability, the toy examples are largely 
irrelevant and do not distinguish the efficiency gap from other measures. Real-
world evidence is how we think the efficiency gap’s stability should be 
evaluated—and in our opinion, this data tells quite a positive story. And as to 
ideology, no gerrymandering metric distinguishes between moderate and 
extreme legislators who belong to the same party. There is also little reason to 
make this distinction, given the extraordinary polarization of both state 
legislatures and Congress. 
A. Methodology 
When we developed the full form of the efficiency gap, we defined surplus 
votes as votes cast for the winning candidate in a race above the 50% (plus one) 
threshold needed for victory.101 We also weighted surplus votes and lost votes 
(votes cast for the losing candidate) equally.102 At the time, both of these 
methodological choices seemed so intuitive to us that we barely bothered 
defending them. In a two-candidate race, 50% (plus one) is the line between 
victory and defeat. It therefore struck us as the obvious benchmark for 
defining surplus votes. Similarly, surplus votes and lost votes are equally 
wasted in that neither one contributes to a candidate’s election. We thus saw no 
reason to weight one kind of wasted vote more or less heavily than the other. 
These choices, it turns out, are not as incontrovertible as we thought. 
Cover and a dissenting federal judge both suggest defining surplus votes 
relative to the losing candidate’s performance, not 50% (plus one).103 Under this 
 
 101. See McGhee, supra note 5, at 68; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 851. 
 102. See McGhee, supra note 5, at 68; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 851-52. 
 103. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 958 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (Griesbach, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]ll you need to win an election in a two-candidate race is one more vote than the 
footnote continued on next page 
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approach, 20% of the vote would be wasted when a candidate wins 60% to 40% 
(60% – 40%), not 10% (60% – 50%). Cho, Cover, and Nagle also propose different 
weighting schemes for surplus and lost votes. Cho suggests that only surplus 
votes should be taken into account.104 Cover adjusts the weight of surplus 
votes (relative to lost votes) from zero to one.105 And Nagle varies this weight 
from zero (meaning only lost votes would be counted) to infinity (counting 
only surplus votes).106 
We regard all these variants of the original efficiency gap as unwise. 
Defining surplus votes relative to the losing candidate’s performance overlooks 
the fact that in a two-candidate race, all votes not cast for one candidate are cast 
for her opponent. If a candidate wins 60% to 40%, for example, this candidate 
would lose if 20% of the vote were deemed surplus, deducted from her total, and 
then added to her adversary’s tally. The maximum vote the candidate could 
afford to cede to her rival while still prevailing is 10% (minus one)—or exactly 
our definition of surplus votes. 
Analogously, we disagree with Cho that it is somehow “more nuanced” to 
“count[] only excess winning votes.”107 Doing so implies that lost votes are 
immaterial and that the cracking that produces them need not be incorporated 
into a measure of partisan gerrymandering. But cracking is a fundamental 
gerrymandering technique that no valid measure should ignore.  
By the same token, we disagree with Cover and Nagle that surplus votes 
are less problematic than lost votes. True, “the voter who casts a surplus vote 
gets to be represented by the candidate of her choice.”108 But gerrymandering is 
inherently a statewide activity whose essence is the more efficient conversion of 
votes into seats in the aggregate.109 From this perspective, district-specific 
representation is beside the point, and surplus votes are every bit as ineffective 
as lost votes. 
While we find our rejoinders to be persuasive, they rely on perspectives on 
wasted votes that may not be universally shared. There are two additional 
 
other candidate, not 50%-plus-one of the total votes.”), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289, and 
jurisdiction postponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017); Cover, supra note 15, at 1181-84; id. at 1215-
16, 1216 n.275 (suggesting a range of plausible definitions of wasted votes for a winning 
party); see also Best et al., supra note 12, at 5 (noting that our definition of wasted votes 
by the winning party is “disputable”). 
 104. See Cho, supra note 18, at 23 (arguing that this alternative measure is “not perfect . . . , 
but it does fix [a] shortcoming of the efficiency gap”).  
 105. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1215-16. 
 106. See Nagle, supra note 15, at 199-201; see also Warrington, supra note 15, at 12-14 (also 
noting several different ways to treat wasted votes). 
 107. See Cho, supra note 18, at 23 (emphasis omitted). 
 108. Cover, supra note 15, at 1181. 
 109. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
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problems with the variants of the efficiency gap, though, that are less 
conceptual and more rooted in the criteria we presented in Part I above. First, 
one of us used district plan simulations to assess the variants’ consistency with 
the efficiency principle.110 (We presented these results in Figure 1 above.) None 
of the variants satisfies the principle. The worst offender is the efficiency gap 
calculated with the alternative definition of surplus votes (relative to the losing 
candidate’s performance), which violates the principle in almost all electoral 
environments.111 The efficiency gap calculated with only lost votes fares better 
but still increasingly violates the principle as more of the statewide vote goes to 
third parties.112 The same is true for the “voter-centric” variant of the 
efficiency gap introduced by Nagle113 (and reprised by Cover114), which 
compares the parties’ respective shares (rather than numbers) of wasted votes. It 
too increasingly violates the efficiency principle as third-party performance 
improves.115 
The second problem with the efficiency gap variants is that they are at 
odds with U.S. electoral history. Recall that the original efficiency gap stays 
constant if seat share changes at twice the rate of vote share—and that 
responsiveness has, in fact, been very close to 2 in state house and congressional 
elections over the last half-century.116 In contrast, the efficiency gap calculated 
with the alternative definition of surplus votes implies an ideal responsiveness 
of 3.117 This is a higher level of responsiveness than U.S. elections have 
exhibited in the modern era. Likewise, both the efficiency gap calculated with 
only lost votes118 and the voter-centric efficiency gap introduced by Nagle and 
 
 110. See McGhee, supra note 21, at 16-20.  
 111. See supra Figure 1 (“Full Surplus Margin” column).  
 112. See supra Figure 1 (“No Surplus” column).  
 113. See Nagle, supra note 15, at 201-03.  
 114. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1222-27; see also McGhee, supra note 5, at 69 (noting that the 
efficiency gap could also be defined in this way). 
 115. See supra Figure 1 (“Voter-Centric” column). As for Cho’s surplus votes-only variant, see 
supra note 104 and accompanying text, Nagle has shown that surplus votes can be 
equalized only when each party receives exactly 50% of the statewide vote, see Nagle, 
supra note 15, at 201 & n.18. Cho’s variant is also exclusively a function of vote share 
and thus completely ignores seat share. 
 116. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text; supra Figure 6. 
 117. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1215-16, 1220 tbl.5 (“[a]lternative definition” row in the 
table); McGhee, supra note 21, at 12 (“[U]sing the full difference implies a much higher 
acceptable seat share for the majority party: for any increase in vote share, the majority 
can earn three times the seat share and still be within acceptable normative bounds.”). 
 118. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1215-16, 1220 tbl.5 (“[a]lternative weighting” row in the 
table); McGhee, supra note 21, at 13 (“[A] version that dispenses with surplus votes 
entirely . . . implies a 1-to-1 ratio (proportionality).”). 
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Cover119 imply an ideal responsiveness of 1. This is both a lower level of 
responsiveness than U.S. elections have historically exhibited and nothing 
more than a measure of deviation from proportional representation. Whatever 
its normative appeal, disproportionality, of course, is almost certainly 
precluded as a metric by Supreme Court precedent.120 
While Cover focuses on devising variants of the efficiency gap, he makes 
one more methodological critique: that the measure is highly sensitive to how 
votes are imputed for uncontested races.121 Votes have to be imputed when 
races do not feature a candidate from each major party because data is required 
for each district and voter opinion is not actually unanimous when a candidate 
wins 100% of the two-party vote.122 These imputations are typically based on a 
regression model for contested races, where the legislative vote is the dependent 
variable, the presidential vote is the key independent variable, and indicators 
are also included for incumbency status. This model is then deployed to 
estimate how each party would have performed in uncontested races had they, in 
fact, featured candidates from both major parties.123 
To begin with, Cover’s objection applies to all measures of partisan 
gerrymandering—partisan bias, the mean-median difference, the difference 
between the parties’ average margins of victory, and so on—not just the 
efficiency gap. All these metrics require data for each district in order to be 
calculated. All of them are also more accurate when imputation is used—that is, 
when uncontested races are neither omitted from the analysis nor treated as if 
they were won unanimously. There is simply nothing about imputation that is 
specific to the efficiency gap. Rather, it is a generally applicable technique 
social scientists employ whenever data is necessary but unavailable.124 
Additionally, as far as we can tell, it makes little substantive difference 
how exactly imputations are carried out. In our original article on the 
 
 119. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1224-25; Nagle, supra note 15, at 201-02. Deviation from 
proportional representation is also endorsed by Chambers and colleagues. See 
Chambers et al., supra note 15, at 15-16 (“recalibrat[ing]” the metric into a new measure 
that “associates the ideal situation with complete proportionality”). 
 120. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1185-89. 
 122. See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and 
Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 514 app. A at 549-50 (1994) (“The fact that a seat is 
uncontested is an indication of strong support in a district, but certainly not 100% 
support.”); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 865-67 (noting that although the 
winner in an uncontested race might have been the same had there been an opponent, 
“the share of the vote for the winner almost certainly would have been lower”).  
 123. See Jackman North Carolina Report, supra note 42, at 20-26; Jackman Wisconsin 
Report, supra note 65, at 24-32; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 866-67. 
 124. Cf. Gelman & King, supra note 122, app. A at 550 (“For many applications, we believe 
some imputation for uncontested districts is essential.”). 
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efficiency gap, we used the presidential vote and incumbency status to estimate 
the parties’ vote shares in uncontested congressional districts.125 We then 
relied on these estimates to calculate the simplified form of the efficiency gap. 
Using similar data—but without any methodological input from us—Simon 
Jackman, an expert for the plaintiffs in the ongoing North Carolina partisan 
gerrymandering litigation, imputed the parties’ votes and vote shares in 
uncontested congressional districts.126 He then computed both the full form 
and the simplified form of the efficiency gap.127 
Figure 7 below plots the simplified form of the efficiency gap as calculated 
by Jackman (on the y-axis) versus the simplified form as computed by us (on 
the x-axis). The correlation between the two variables is nearly perfect—a 
whopping 0.98—and almost all the points fall on or very near the best-fit 
line.128 Based on this evidence, we think Cover is simply wrong when he 
claims that “the imputation method chosen may . . . have a significant, even 
outcome-determinative, effect on a plan’s efficiency gap.”129 On rare occasions, 
it might make a difference which technique was used. But imputation cannot 
be nearly as influential as Cover supposes if separate scholars, proceeding 
independently with their analyses, arrived at essentially the same results for 
hundreds of congressional elections across dozens of states and years. To the 
contrary, the better conclusion is the one reached by Grofman and King with 
respect to partisan bias: namely, that while “[e]xperts can disagree about which 
set of input data is relevant for a given case, . . . the resulting measures . . . 
normally will not differ to any significant degree because the best current 
methods are quite robust to changes in model specification.”130 
 
 125. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 866. 
 126. See Jackman North Carolina Report, supra note 42, at 20-26. We did not carry out this 
exercise for state house elections because we did not have access to the presidential vote 
aggregated by state house district, while Jackman did have this data for some elections. 
Compare Jackman Wisconsin Report, supra note 65, at 26 (“[One] imputation model 
relies on presidential election returns reported at the level of state legislative dis-
tricts.”), with id. at 29 (using a second model to account for the fact that “presidential 
vote isn’t always available at the level of state legislative districts”), and Stephanopoulos 
& McGhee, supra note 5, at 866-67 (“Unfortunately, we did not have presidential vote 
share data by state house district for all the years in our analysis . . . .”). 
 127. See Jackman North Carolina Report, supra note 42, at 27-32 (giving the results of the 
calculations of the full form). Though he calculated the simplified form as well, 
Jackman did not include the results in his report. 
 128. The cases farthest from the best-fit line are mostly from the 1970s and 1980s. From 
1992 to the mid-2010s, the correlation between the two sets of efficiency gap scores is 
0.99. 
 129. Cover, supra note 15, at 1186. 
 130. Grofman & King, supra note 1, at 17. 
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Figure 7 
Imputations and the Efficiency Gap 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plot of the efficiency gap calculated by Jackman versus the efficiency gap 
we calculated, using the simplified method, for congressional elections from 1972 
to 2016. 
 
B. Variability 
Turning from methodology to variability, Krasno and colleagues and Cho 
present hypothetical examples of one or two districts and argue based on them 
that the efficiency gap is either not changeable enough (Cho) or too changeable 
(Krasno and colleagues). Cho emphasizes the fact that if the parties’ statewide 
vote shares are fixed, the efficiency gap can exhibit at most as many values as 
there are seats in a plan. This property makes the measure too lumpy for her 
taste.131 Krasno and colleagues, on the other hand, point out that as the parties’ 
vote shares vary within a particular district, the efficiency gap flips signs at 
75%-to-25%, at 50%-to-50%, and at 25%-to-75%. They assert that a metric should 
not register so many shifts in the identity of the advantaged party.132 
 
 131. See Cho, supra note 18, at 21-23. The efficiency gap’s performance in a two-district 
setting is also criticized by Chambers and colleagues. See Chambers et al., supra note 15, 
at 31-32. 
 132. See Krasno et al., supra note 12, at 13-14. 
The Measure of a Metric 
70 STAN. L. REV. 1503 (2018) 
1542 
 
First, Krasno and colleagues improperly apply the efficiency gap to a single 
district.133 The measure is only valid for a district map as a whole, for which it 
indicates which party more efficiently converts its aggregate votes into 
aggregate seats. The efficiency gap simply has no intelligible meaning for one 
district taken in isolation. Whatever edge a party happens to enjoy in that 
district may be offset—or magnified—by outcomes in the plan’s other districts. 
Indeed, no gerrymandering metric yields meaningful results for a single 
district. Consider partisan bias134: It cannot even be calculated for one district 
because in a hypothetical tied election, neither party can be deemed to have 
won the lone available seat. Or take Krasno and colleagues’ preferred measure, 
the mean-median difference135: A party’s mean and median vote shares are 
always identical for a single district, so the difference between them is always 
zero. Or think of the difference between the parties’ average margins of 
victory136: It too cannot be computed for one district because only one party 
even records a victory in the first place. 
Next, the lumpiness to which Cho objects is a function not of the efficien-
cy gap but rather of seats themselves in a single-member-district system. Such 
seats are exceedingly lumpy: They transform a continuous variable (a party’s 
vote share) into a binary variable (whether a party wins or loses a district). 
Accordingly, any metric that takes seats into account must exhibit a level of 
lumpiness similar to that of the efficiency gap. The lumpiness follows 
unavoidably from seats’ winner-take-all nature. 
Table 2 below makes this point by displaying a revised version of a table 
created by Cho.137 Cho outlines seven scenarios for a two-district plan, in 
which both districts are won by the same margin and the winning party’s 
statewide vote share ranges from 51% to 99%. Cho calculates the efficiency gap 
for each scenario, finding that it varies from 48% against party A (in scenario 1) 
to 48% in favor of party A (in scenario 7).138 Cho also shows (and this is the nub 
of her critique) that in each scenario, no matter how votes are allocated 
 
 133. See id. at 13 (“[C]onsider how efficiency gap moves as election results may vary in a 
single district.”). 
 134. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
 136. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 137. See Cho, supra note 18, at 21-22, 21 tbl.2. Cho includes columns that we omit for  
party A’s and party B’s wasted votes and for her variant of the efficiency gap calculated 
with only surplus votes. See id. at 21 tbl.2. As noted above, her surplus votes-only 
variant is strictly a function of vote share. See supra note 115. It thus varies dramatically 
as party A’s vote share rises from 51% to 99%—and yields the odd conclusion that  
party A’s advantage grows as its voters become more packed in each district. See Cho, 
supra note 18, at 21 tbl.2. 
 138. See Cho, supra note 18, at 21 tbl.2.  
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between party A and party B, the efficiency gap can take on either one value (if 
party B lacks enough votes to win a district) or two (if party B is able to win a 
district).139 
Table 2 below adds four columns to Cho’s table: one computing partisan 
bias, another the mean-median difference, and two more listing the possible 
values of partisan bias and the mean-median difference if the parties’ votes 
were distributed in different ways.140 Partisan bias cannot be calculated for any 
of the scenarios because in all of them, both districts would be split 50%-to-50% 
in a hypothetical tied election and so could not be assigned to either party. 
Aside from this null result, the only possible value for partisan bias if the 
parties’ votes were reallocated is zero, indicating that each party would win 
one district in the counterfactual tied election. Similarly, the mean-median 
difference is zero both in every scenario and in every possible reallocation of 
the parties’ votes. This is because in a two-district plan, as in a one-district plan, 
a party’s mean and median vote shares are always identical. 
The conclusion we draw from this exercise is that even in a highly 
artificial two-district setting, the efficiency gap performs better in terms of 
lumpiness than other measures of partisan gerrymandering. The efficiency gap 
varies from one scenario to another; partisan bias cannot be computed for any 
of them while the mean-median difference stays constant at zero. The 
efficiency gap can also exhibit up to two values under different distributions of 
the parties’ votes; partisan bias and the mean-median difference can only 
exhibit one. Cho’s complaint about the efficiency gap thus seems misplaced: If 
anything, it is the alternatives to the efficiency gap that are more affected by 
seats’ binary nature.141 
 
 139. See id. at 22.  
 140. Table 2 also tweaks the possible efficiency gap values for scenarios 4-7. In each case, if 
the parties’ votes were reallocated so that one district was split 50-to-50, then the 
efficiency gap could not be calculated because no winning or losing party could be 
identified for that district. 
 141. Cho also argues that “[b]ecause the different scenarios yield different possible values for 
the efficiency gap, comparing across scenarios is problematic.” Cho, supra note 18, at 22. 
But again, this point is less applicable to the efficiency gap than to other, lumpier 
measures. Moreover, both the efficiency gap and other metrics become far less lumpy—
indeed, essentially continuous—once real-world conditions of many districts and 
shifting seat and vote shares are introduced. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 15, at 205 n.37 
(“[W]hen there are many legislative districts, . . . such jumps become statistically small, 
and the [efficiency gap] method is likely to be appropriate.”). And as we have previously 
explained, gerrymandering metrics may be presented in seats rather than seat shares 
when there are concerns about lumpiness. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, 
at 868-69. There is nothing unusual about this move; to the contrary, analysts 
frequently switch between absolute values and percentages depending on the issue 
being addressed. 
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Table 2 
Measures of Partisan Gerrymandering in Two-District Scenarios 
Scenario District 
Party 
A 
Votes 
Party 
B 
Votes 
EG 
Possible 
EG 
Values 
Bias 
Possible 
Bias 
Values 
MMD 
Possible 
MMD 
Values 
1 
1 99 1 
0.48 {0.48} N/A {N/A, 0} 0 {0} 
2 99 1 
2 
1 90 10 
0.30 {0.30} N/A {N/A, 0} 0 {0} 
2 90 10 
3 
1 80 20 
0.10 {0.10} N/A {N/A, 0} 0 {0} 
2 80 20 
4 
1 75 25 
0 {0, N/A} N/A {N/A, 0} 0 {0} 
2 75 25 
5 
1 70 30 
–0.10 
{–0.10, 
0.40, N/A} 
N/A {N/A, 0} 0 {0} 
2 70 30 
6 
1 60 40 
–0.30 
{–0.30, 
0.20, N/A} 
N/A {N/A, 0} 0 {0} 
2 60 40 
7 
1 51 49 
–0.48 
{–0.48, 
0.02, N/A} 
N/A {N/A, 0} 0 {0} 
2 51 49 
For seven different scenarios, each with two districts, the table shows the parties’ 
votes as well as actual and possible values of the efficiency gap (EG), partisan bias 
(Bias), and mean-median difference (MMD). 
 
Best and colleagues and Krasno and colleagues criticize the efficiency gap 
for one more reason relating to its variability. They calculate the measure for 
Iowa’s and North Carolina’s current state senate plans and for Wisconsin’s 
current state house plan using exogenous election results.142 (Exogenous 
elections are for offices unrelated to the map in question, such as the presidency 
or the governorship.) They then note that the efficiency gap changes based on 
which exogenous election is used to compute it. This mutability is problematic, 
in their view, because it means that one’s substantive conclusion about a map 
might vary along with the electoral environment.143 
To start, it is poor methodological form to analyze plans using exogenous 
election results.144 Voters may well behave differently in these elections than 
when casting their ballots for the office actually at issue. The better approach is  
 
 
 142. See Best et al., supra note 12, at 10-19 (Iowa and North Carolina); Krasno et al., supra  
note 12, at 5-12 (Wisconsin). 
 143. See Best et al., supra note 12, at 12-13; Krasno et al., supra note 12, at 9-12. Krasno and 
colleagues also apply their exogenous election results to simulated district plans, again 
stressing the range of efficiency gaps that arise. See Krasno et al., supra note 12, at 7-12. 
 144. This critique also applies to Cho’s calculation of the efficiency gap using the 
presidential vote and then, even further removed from endogenous elections, party 
registration data. See Cho, supra note 18, at 28-32. 
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to use election results for the relevant office whenever races are contested, and 
to impute outcomes through the methods described above whenever races are 
uncontested.145 As Grofman and King wrote more than a decade ago, one 
cannot “assum[e] that votes in statewide elections for statewide candidates have 
any particular ex ante relationship with votes for legislative candidates.”146 
Instead, one should examine this relationship empirically using “recent 
election results, the presence of an incumbent in the district, and whether the 
race is contested.”147 
Krasno and colleagues also evaluate the efficiency gap’s variability rather 
simplistically. They merely point out that it changes when one or another 
exogenous election is used to calculate it.148 But all measures of partisan 
gerrymandering shift as the parties’ seats and votes fluctuate.149 The key 
questions are how much the metrics vary and whether their volatility is severe 
enough to undermine their usefulness. 
One way to answer these questions is by calculating the measures’ standard 
deviations. From 1972 to the mid-2010s, the standard deviation of the 
efficiency gap was 6.3% at the state house level and 9.2% at the congressional 
level.150 By comparison, the standard deviation of partisan bias (which is also 
denominated in units of seat share) was 8.2% at the state house level and 10.6% 
at the congressional level over this period—or slightly higher than that of the 
efficiency gap. Analogously, the standard deviation of the mean-median 
difference was 3.8% at the state house level and 5.6% at the congressional level. 
Because the mean-median difference is denominated in units of vote share 
rather than seat share, these figures must be roughly doubled to be made 
comparable.151 When they are doubled, they are again slightly higher than the 
efficiency gap’s standard deviation. 
 
 145. For more on imputation techniques, see text accompanying note 123 above. 
 146. Grofman & King, supra note 1, at 12. 
 147. Id.; see also Gelman & King, supra note 122, at 524 (“[I]t is clear that the variables [used to 
calculate a gerrymandering metric] should certainly include past legislative election 
results, when available.”); Wang, Tests for Practical Evaluation, supra note 12, at 1280 (“For 
analyzing congressional or legislative districts, the results of congressional or 
legislative elections themselves have the advantage of being a direct measure of voter 
preference for the type of office under dispute . . . .”). 
 148. See Krasno et al., supra note 12, at 10.  
 149. See Warrington, supra note 15, at 9 (“[A]ny measure of asymmetry in vote distributions 
will vary from election to election . . . .”). 
 150. We calculated all the figures referred to in this paragraph and the next one using our 
datasets of partisan gerrymandering metrics. 
 151. Recall that the seat-to-vote relationship in U.S. elections has been very close to 2-to-1 
over the last half-century. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
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Another way to tackle these issues is to compute what proportion of a 
metric’s total variation occurs between (rather than within) district plans. (Plans 
are typically redrawn each decade and used for five elections.) The higher this 
proportion, the better a measure captures a durable, plan-specific characteris-
tic. From 1972 to the mid-2010s, 74% of the efficiency gap’s variation was 
between plans at the state house level, and 60% was between plans at the 
congressional level.152 The analogous figures for partisan bias were 86% and 
74%; for the mean-median difference they were 83% and 75%. Thus, the bulk of 
the variation for all three metrics was between plans over the last half-century, 
and this plan-specific component was modestly stronger for partisan bias and 
the mean-median difference than for the efficiency gap. 
Why does the efficiency gap for a given plan vary somewhat more than 
partisan bias or the mean-median difference? The explanation is that only the 
efficiency gap takes into account the seats actually won or lost by the parties. 
Partisan bias is based on the seats won or lost in a hypothetical tied election—
which often stay the same even as the seats won or lost in reality change. The 
mean-median difference ignores the parties’ seat shares altogether; it is 
calculated using only the parties’ vote shares. The efficiency gap therefore 
sacrifices some stability for the sake of better correspondence with the concept 
of partisan gerrymandering. At its core, gerrymandering is about translating 
actual votes into actual seats more efficiently. Actual votes and seats fluctuate 
more than either hypothetical seats or actual votes alone. The efficiency gap 
reflects this fluctuation yet remains only moderately more volatile than the 
other measures.153 
Informative as they are, standard deviations and proportions of variation 
are a bit abstract. A more practical test—one of particular interest to litigants 
and courts154—is whether a plan that exhibits a certain efficiency gap in its first 
election is likely to exhibit a similar efficiency gap over its lifetime. If so, then a 
 
 152. For similar calculations, see Jackman North Carolina Report, supra note 42, at 31 
(reporting 59% of the variation in the efficiency gap for congressional plans to be 
“between-plan variation” and therefore concluding that “efficiency gaps are measuring 
an enduring feature of a districting plan”); and Jackman Wisconsin Report, supra  
note 65, at 48 (reporting a between-plan variation of 76% for state house plans and 
concluding similarly). 
 153. For a related argument, see Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 864. See also 
McGhee, supra note 5, at 76 (“A measure should not force stability . . . or it risks 
ignoring some of the very properties it is meant to test.”); Warrington, supra note 15, at 
18 (“[T]he mean-median difference doesn’t keep track of the number of seats won by 
each party. This is probably the main reason it is slightly more stable from election to 
election than the efficiency gap . . . .”). 
 154. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 905 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (relying on evidence that 
“[t]he party that ‘wastes’ more votes in the first election year is likely to continue 
‘wasting’ more votes in future elections”), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 2289, and jurisdiction 
postponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017). 
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plan’s initial efficiency gap would be a reliable indicator of the plan’s future 
performance, and decisions could be made on the basis of that first score. If not, 
then the efficiency gap’s within-plan variation would prevent observers from 
reaching any robust conclusions after a single election.155 
Figure 8 below plots plans’ lifetime average efficiency gaps (on the y-axis) 
versus their initial efficiency gaps (on the x-axis) for state house elections (top 
chart) and congressional elections (bottom chart). Only plans that are in place 
for at least three elections (for which averages are more meaningful) are 
included. It is clear from the charts that there is a strong relationship between 
the initial and lifetime average values of the efficiency gap. The correlation is 
0.85 at the state house level and 0.76 at the congressional level, and the points 
cluster around the best-fit lines.156 We think these findings further refute 
Krasno and colleagues’ critique. While the efficiency gap does change from 
year to year, plans’ first scores are an excellent guide to their overall 
performances. Small initial scores tend to remain small, large initial scores 
typically stay large, and observers indeed learn something significant about 
plans from the first data points they produce. 
 
 155. It is just as easy to calculate a plan’s efficiency gap before an election (using predicted 
election results) as afterward (using actual ones). Ex ante calculation may even be 
preferable because it can take into account the full range of plausible outcomes, thus 
avoiding an excessive focus on a single, possibly idiosyncratic election. 
 156. For a similar finding, see Jackman North Carolina Report, supra note 42, at 47-51. 
Jackman further demonstrated the efficiency gap’s stability by examining how often 
plans’ scores flip signs, see Jackman Wisconsin Report, supra note 65, at 53-55, by 
carrying out a series of prognostic tests, see Jackman North Carolina Report, supra  
note 42, at 41-47, and by subjecting current plans to electoral “perturbations” and then 
recalculating their efficiency gaps, see id. at 54-59. 
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Figure 8 
Initial and Lifetime Average Efficiency Gaps 
State Houses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Congressional Delegations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plots of districting plans’ lifetime average efficiency gaps versus their 
initial efficiency gaps for state houses and congressional delegations from 1972 to 
the mid-2010s. Only plans used in at least three elections are included. 
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C. Ideology 
Lastly, Chambers and colleagues point out that the efficiency gap does not 
distinguish between ideologically moderate and extreme legislators who 
belong to the same party.157 As far as the metric is concerned, a Democrat is a 
Democrat and a Republican is a Republican. But, claim Chambers and 
colleagues, competitive districts tend to elect centrists while extremists 
typically win safe seats.158 Maps that appear to benefit one party, considering 
partisanship alone, may thus actually favor the opposition. Compare, for 
instance, a plan with five moderate Democrats, all elected from competitive 
districts, to a plan with three extreme Democrats and two extreme 
Republicans, all winning safe seats.159 A Republican voter might prefer the 
former plan, notwithstanding its more pro-Democratic efficiency gap, because 
it would yield a center-left rather than a far-left legislative median.160 
It is perfectly true, of course, that the efficiency gap does not take into 
account legislators’ (or voters’) political philosophies. This is because it is a 
measure of partisan gerrymandering, not of ideological divergence between the 
legislature and the electorate. Such divergence is important, and we have 
studied it extensively in previous work.161 But it is simply not the same as 
gerrymandering, “the usual point of [which],” according to Justice Souter, “is to 
control the greatest number of seats.”162 Precisely because gerrymandering is 
about votes and seats (not voters’ and legislators’ policy preferences), no other 
metrics consider ideology either. Partisan bias, for example, asks how different 
the parties’ seat shares would be in a hypothetical tied election, while the mean-
median difference looks only at the parties’ vote shares. Ideology is nowhere to 
be found in these (or any other) gauges of gerrymandering.  
Additionally, the empirical premise of Chambers and colleagues’ 
argument—that centrists are elected from competitive districts while 
 
 157. See Chambers et al., supra note 15, at 23 (“[T]he efficiency gap does not contemplate that 
political parties may be heterogeneous.”). 
 158. See id. at 26 (“[P]oliticians elected in politically lopsided districts may be more extreme 
than politicians from politically competitive districts . . . .”). 
 159. See id. at 24 & fig.3 (presenting a hypothetical map that can support both such plans). 
 160. See id. at 24-29 (“All Republicans prefer the first plan, even though every seat is 
captured by the Democrats.”). The dissenter on the Whitford three-judge district court 
made a similar argument. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 954 (W.D. Wis. 
2016) (Griesbach, J., dissenting) (“[A] Republican who has won with only 51% of the 
vote will very likely govern differently than one who has a safe seat . . . .”), stay granted, 
137 S. Ct. 2289, and jurisdiction postponed, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017). 
 161. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
283 (2014); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos et al., The Realities of Electoral Reform, 68 VAND. 
L. REV. 761 (2015). 
 162. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 346 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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extremists win safe seats—is wrong. At least in recent years, there is virtually 
no connection between district composition and legislator ideology. Rather, 
Democratic representatives tend to be liberal and Republicans conservative, no 
matter how precarious or secure their seats happen to be. Devin Caughey and 
colleagues make this point at the state house level using data from 1995 to 
2012.163 They find that legislators’ ideologies barely budge as their margins of 
victory vary.164 A Democrat (Republican) from a competitive district is nearly 
as liberal (conservative) as one from a safe seat.165 David Lee and colleagues 
report similar results at the congressional level using data from 1946 to 1995.166 
Again, House Democrats are very ideologically different from House 
Republicans, and again, representatives’ ideologies are almost unrelated to their 
electoral performances.167 
One implication of these findings is that Chambers and colleagues’ first 
district plan is wildly implausible. Under modern political conditions, a map 
with five competitive but Democratic-leaning seats usually would not elect five 
center-left Democrats. In general, five liberal Democrats would prevail instead, 
their ideologies unaffected by their districts’ makeups. 
The findings’ other implication is that the efficiency gap should be a potent 
driver of ideological divergence between the legislature and the electorate. 
Because the efficiency gap does not distinguish among legislators who belong 
to the same party—and because each party’s legislators are, in fact, mostly 
indistinguishable in their voting records—the metric should be strongly linked 
to ideological noncongruence between representatives and voters. Caughey 
and colleagues test and confirm this hypothesis at the state house level. They 
show that the efficiency gap has a large and statistically significant effect on the 
chamber median, even controlling for a host of other factors.168 One of us 
arrives at the same conclusion at the congressional level. There too, an 
efficiency gap in a party’s favor leads the midpoint of a state’s delegation to 
 
 163. See Devin Caughey et al., Partisan Gerrymandering and the Political Process: Effects on Roll-
Call Voting and State Policies, 16 ELECTION L.J. 453, 457, 458 fig.1 (2017). 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See David S. Lee et al., Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies?: Evidence from the U.S. House, 119 
Q.J. ECON. 807, 824-25, 825 n.17, 838-39 (2004); id. at 840 fig.VI (top graph). For similar 
findings at the congressional level, see Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate 
Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 136, 139-42, 142 fig.1 (2001); and 
Nolan McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666, 
670-71, 671 fig.3 (2009). While these studies find a slight intraparty relationship 
between vote share and ideology, it is dwarfed by the interparty differences between 
legislators. 
 167. See Lee et al., supra note 166, at 840 fig.VI (top graph). 
 168. See Caughey et al., supra note 163, at 461-64. 
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shift in this party’s direction, even holding voter opinion constant.169 
Accordingly, Chambers and colleagues fail to undermine the appeal of the 
efficiency gap by changing the subject from partisan gerrymandering to 
ideological divergence. The efficiency gap is not a measure of ideological 
divergence, but the partisan skew it captures is a powerful cause of such 
divergence. 
IV. Other Gerrymandering Metrics 
We began to address gerrymandering metrics other than the efficiency gap 
in the previous Part. We explained that all measures—not just the efficiency 
gap—require imputations for uncontested races and do not consider voters’ or 
legislators’ ideologies. We also showed that partisan bias and the mean-median 
difference are even lumpier than the efficiency gap in a two-district example. 
We found as well that partisan bias and the mean-median difference vary 
somewhat less than the efficiency gap, though at the cost of worse conceptual 
correspondence. 
In this Part we make three further points about other gerrymandering 
metrics. First, there is no need for scholars or courts to embrace a single 
measure. In other areas of redistricting law, multiple metrics harmoniously 
coexist, and the same should be possible in this domain. Second, there exist 
deep mathematical relationships between the various measures of gerryman-
dering. Factor analysis also confirms that the metrics mostly reflect the same 
underlying concept. And third, despite our generally open stance toward other 
measures, we do harbor some reservations about them. In particular, they 
perform poorly on two of our criteria—compliance with the efficiency 
principle and breadth of scope.  
A. Multiplicity 
Partisan gerrymandering is far from the only redistricting field that relies 
heavily on statistics. In contexts including reapportionment, racial vote 
dilution, and racial gerrymandering, quantitative metrics also take center stage. 
In these areas, interestingly, there has been little interest in crowning a single 
best measure. Instead, academics and judges have been happy to calculate and 
cite multiple metrics, using them in tandem to bolster their conclusions. We 
see no reason why the same inclusive approach could not be emulated in the 
partisan gerrymandering domain. 
Consider malapportionment cases, where a key issue is the extent to which 
a plan’s districts deviate from perfectly equal population. Courts most 
 
 169. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 69 (manuscript at 17-18); id. (manuscript app. at 27 tbl.5). 
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commonly analyze this issue using total deviation: the percentage gap in 
population between a plan’s most populous and least populous districts.170 But 
courts also often refer to average deviation: the mean difference between each 
district’s population and the population required for perfect equality.171 Courts 
further invoke the proportion of a state’s population that could elect a majority 
of the legislature under a plan.172 These measures are not equivalent: They 
sometimes point in different directions, and they have distinct strengths and 
weaknesses. Courts, however, have been uninterested in this theoretical debate. 
They have recognized that the metrics are usually consistent with one another, 
and they have cited them more or less interchangeably.173 
Or take claims under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act that districts have 
the effect of diluting minorities’ votes, for which a prerequisite for liability is a 
showing of racial polarization in voting.174 Racial polarization can be 
calculated through both homogeneous precinct analysis (comparing outcomes 
in heavily white and heavily minority precincts) and ecological regression 
(with election results as the dependent variable and racial composition as the 
main independent variable). In a pivotal 1986 case, the Supreme Court wrote 
favorably about both of these techniques, calling them “complementary 
methods of analysis” that are “standard in the literature.”175 Ever since, as James 
Greiner notes in a survey of the vote dilution case law, “courts [have] relied on 
expert testimony resting on both homogenous precinct analysis and 
regression.”176 Indeed, courts have also been receptive to a third method for 
 
 170. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 728 (1983); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 761 
(1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 528-29 (1969). 
 171. See, e.g., Karcher, 462 U.S. at 728; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 737 (1973) (also 
referring to the median deviation); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319 (1973). 
 172. See, e.g., Howell, 410 U.S. at 319; Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 442 (1967); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545 (1964). 
 173. For examples of cases citing multiple measures of population deviation, see Karcher, 
462 U.S. at 728 (reporting total deviation and average deviation); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 737 
& nn.1-2 (citing these two measures as well as the ratio of the largest district population 
to the smallest district population); Howell, 410 U.S. at 319 (using the same three 
measures as Gaffney as well as the proportion of population that could elect a majority 
and the fractions of districts sufficiently close to and excessively far from the “ideal”); 
and Swann, 385 U.S. at 442-43 (using all of these measures). 
 174. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-52, 55-58 (1986); see also Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982, § 3, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as amended at 52 
U.S.C. § 10301 (2016)). 
 175. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52-53, 53 n.20. 
 176. D. James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We Now, 
and Where Do We Want to Be?, 47 JURIMETRICS 115 app. A at 155 (2007) (collecting cases). 
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computing racial polarization: King’s ecological inference, which more 
effectively deploys the same data used in conventional regression.177 
Geographic compactness—how “normal” or “strange” districts look—offers 
one more example of metric multiplicity and coexistence.178 Compactness is 
legally significant in effects-based racial vote dilution cases (because plaintiffs 
must show that a compact remedial district exists)179 and in racial gerryman-
dering litigation (where noncompactness is probative evidence of a 
predominant racial purpose).180 Compactness can also be quantified in literally 
dozens of ways. As a recent study observes, “Numerous specific compactness 
measures have been proposed in the academic literature, each one fitting 
different . . . conceptual definitions and intuitions for certain geographical 
configurations.”181 Scholars have not selected a “gold standard” among these 
metrics, but rather “have managed to use [them] productively in research by 
combining multiple measures, adjusting or weighting each for specific 
purposes, or making careful qualitative decisions in specific cases.”182 Courts 
too have no preferred compactness metric, instead relying on several without 
any evident unease.183 
The lesson from other redistricting contexts is thus that no quest for a 
single holy grail has been—or has to be—attempted. Academics may develop a 
range of partisan gerrymandering measures, each capturing a separate aspect of 
the practice. It is less important for them to rank metrics or to endorse one 
while rejecting all others. Judges, similarly, may benefit from experts who 
quantify plans’ partisan skews in different ways, each adding to their 
understanding of the maps’ properties. Judges may be more confident in their 
 
 177. See id. at 138-43; id. app. A at 158 (“[J]udicial reaction to King’s [ecological inference] has 
generally been favorable.”). See generally GARY KING, A SOLUTION TO THE ECOLOGICAL 
INFERENCE PROBLEM: RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR FROM AGGREGATE DATA 
(1997) (introducing what is now known as King’s ecological inference). 
 178. Nagle has also analogized measuring partisan gerrymandering to measuring 
compactness. See Nagle, supra note 14, at 347-48 (“[H]aving different measures of 
partisan bias is somewhat similar to having different measures of compactness.”). 
 179. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 (“[T]he minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member 
district.” (emphasis added)). 
 180. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995) (“[B]izarreness . . . may be persuasive 
circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake . . . was the legislature’s dominant and 
controlling rationale in drawing its district lines.”). 
 181. Aaron Kaufman et al., How to Measure Legislative District Compactness If You Only 
Know It When You See It 5 (Feb. 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc 
/GW5U-HYXE. 
 182. Id. at 6. 
 183. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460, 1472-73 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ Section 2 results claim after assessing a district with “any number of 
quantitative measures of compactness commonly used in political science”). 
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rulings when different measures tell the same story and may be less certain 
when metrics diverge.184 
B. Relationships 
Another reason we are sanguine about the use of multiple gerrymandering 
measures is that most of them are linked mathematically to one another. 
Because they have been published elsewhere, we do not include formal proofs 
here, but rather describe qualitatively the ties between the metrics. We do, 
however, present a factor analysis of gerrymandering measures. It shows that 
they are connected empirically as well as mathematically. 
First, as we pointed out in our original article on the efficiency gap, the 
metric is equal to partisan bias if it is calculated using the simplified method 
and an election is tied statewide.185 Recall that the simplified formula for the 
efficiency gap is EG = (S – 0.5) – 2 * (V – 0.5), where S is a party’s statewide seat 
share and V is the party’s average vote share across all districts. If an election is 
tied statewide, V is 0.5, so this formula shortens further to EG = (S – 0.5). This, 
of course, is the very definition of partisan bias: the distance of a party’s seat 
share from 50% in a tied election. 
Second, as Cover elegantly establishes, the simplified form of the efficiency 
gap is always equal to the difference between the parties’ average margins of 
victory—at least if two small tweaks are made to the latter measure. One is that 
each party’s victory margin in each district must be subtracted from 50%.186 
The other is that the parties’ average victory margins must be weighted by 
their overall seat shares.187 With these two adjustments, a mathematical 
identity follows, as does an important substantive implication: The efficiency 
gap connotes not just differential cracking and packing but also differential 
competitiveness. Indeed, differential cracking and packing is differential 
competitiveness.188 
And third, as Nagle and others demonstrate, the mean-median difference is 
equal to partisan bias divided by the slope of the seat-vote curve at the point 
 
 184. See Cain et al., supra note 70 (manuscript at 4) (“[A]ny systematic evaluation of partisan 
bias should utilize several political fairness measures.”); Nagle, supra note 14, at 348 
(“[T]here are several measures that essentially agree, so having different measures 
should not block the inclusion of partisan bias in election reform.”). However, as we 
discuss below, certain metrics should not be used in certain electoral environments: 
Inclusiveness has its limits. See infra Part IV.C. 
 185. See McGhee, supra note 5, at 68-70; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 856. 
 186. See Cover, supra note 15, at 1198-1201, 1205-06. 
 187. See id. at 1205-06. 
 188. See id. at 1206-08. 
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where the two parties split the vote.189 Partisan bias is a party’s seat share minus 
50% in an election in which the party’s vote share is 50%, while the mean-
median difference is a party’s vote share minus 50% in an election in which the 
party’s seat share is 50%. In charts like those displayed in Figure 6 above, 
partisan bias is the vertical distance between the seat-vote curve and the point 
where vote share and seat share are both 50%, while the mean-median 
difference is the horizontal distance. This close relationship explains a theme 
that is already apparent and that becomes even clearer below: Partisan bias and 
the mean-median difference have nearly identical strengths and weaknesses, 
and they are linked to the efficiency gap in almost exactly the same ways. 
To further illuminate the connections between measures of partisan 
gerrymandering, we carry out a factor analysis. This is a data reduction 
technique that seeks to identify latent variables that cannot be measured 
directly but that influence the values of a set of observed variables. The latent 
variables yielded by the method are linear functions of the observed variables 
and explain as much as possible of the variance in the data.190 We perform the 
analysis for four gerrymandering metrics: the efficiency gap, partisan bias, the 
mean-median difference, and a newer measure called the declination. The 
declination is calculated by plotting a plan’s districts in order from lowest to 
highest vote share. Two lines are then drawn, one between the median 
Democrat-won district and the 50% axis, and another between the median 
Republican-won district and the 50% axis. The angle between these lines is the 
declination.191 We include it in the factor analysis because, despite its novelty, 
it strikes us as a promising statistic. 
Table 3 below tabulates the results of the analysis for state house and 
congressional elections from 1972 to the mid-2010s. At both levels, two factors 
are retained. The first of these is by far the more important, accounting for 
97.2% of the variance at the state house level and 95.1% at the congressional 
level. All the gerrymandering metrics load heavily onto this factor. The second 
retained factor explains a much more modest 7.5% of the variance at the state 
 
 189. See McDonald & Best, supra note 12, at 314-16; McGhee, supra note 21, at 6-7; Nagle, 
supra note 14, at 351 & fig.4. 
 190. For a more detailed discussion, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1903, 1938 (2012). 
 191. See Warrington, supra note 15, at 3-6. The intuition behind the declination is that 
“[p]artisan gerrymandering . . . modifies a natural distribution in a manner that treats 
the 0.5 threshold as special.” See id. at 3. If the district distribution does not shift at the 
50% axis, then the two lines have the same slope and the declination is zero. But if there 
is a break at the 50% axis, typically caused by differential cracking and packing, then 
the two lines’ slopes diverge and the declination indicates the extent of each party’s 
advantage or disadvantage. See id. 
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house level and 12.9% at the congressional level.192 All the metrics have smaller 
loadings onto this factor. The signs of the loadings also diverge here, with 
pairings emerging between the efficiency gap and the declination, on the one 
hand, and partisan bias and the mean-median difference on the other. 
Table 3 
Factor Analysis Results 
 
Factor 1: 
Generic 
Party 
Advantage 
Factor 2: 
Seat-Specific 
Party 
Advantage 
State Houses 
Efficiency gap 0.794 0.277 
Partisan bias 0.933 –0.184 
Mean-median difference 0.844 –0.282 
Declination 0.909 0.209 
Eigenvalue 3.039 0.234 
Proportion of variance 0.972 0.075 
Congressional Delegations 
Efficiency gap 0.825 –0.342 
Partisan bias 0.817 0.293 
Mean-median difference 0.735 0.337 
Declination 0.904 –0.227 
Eigenvalue 2.705 0.368 
Proportion of variance 0.951 0.129 
The table lists the loadings of each measure of partisan gerrymandering onto each 
of the two retained factors from a factor analysis for state houses and congres-
sional delegations. It also lists each factor’s eigenvalue and proportion of variance 
explained. 
 
These findings support two conclusions. One is that to a significant extent, 
all the measures of partisan gerrymandering reflect the same latent variable, 
which we call generic party advantage. This is why the first retained factor 
accounts for such an impressive share of the variance in the data and why all 
 
 192. The retained factors in principal factor analysis account for more than 100% of the 
variance in the data when the nonretained factors account for negative proportions of 
the variance. All the factors together explain exactly 100% of the variance. 
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the metrics load so heavily onto this factor.193 The second takeaway is that to 
the degree the measures diverge, the efficiency gap and the declination fit into 
one category, while partisan bias and the mean-median difference fit into 
another. This is why each group loads with divergent signs onto the second 
factor, which we dub seat-specific party advantage. This name stems from the 
fact that the efficiency gap and the declination consider the seats actually won 
by each party, while partisan bias and the mean-median difference do not. This 
distinction likely explains the behavior of the second factor—and why a second 
factor emerges in the first place. 
C. Reservations 
To this point, our discussion in this Part has emphasized the virtues of 
multiplicity, especially given the relationships that exist between different 
gerrymandering metrics. We now turn to the drawbacks, under our evaluative 
criteria, of measures other than the efficiency gap. They do not always comply 
with the efficiency principle, and they cannot be used in certain electoral 
environments. We hasten to add that these shortcomings do not mean that the 
metrics should be discarded. The implication is only that their properties 
should be fully understood before they are employed. 
To see why partisan bias and the mean-median difference sometimes 
violate the efficiency principle, it is helpful to return to the efficiency gap 
examples we presented in Table 1 above.194 Table 4 below reproduces these 
examples and also computes partisan bias and the mean-median difference for 
each election. Partisan bias is 20% in favor of party B in the first election. Since 
party A received 55% of the vote and party B received 45%, 5% of the vote must 
be deducted from party A and added to party B in each district to simulate a tied 
election. When this adjustment is carried out, party A wins 3 districts (1-3) and 
party B wins 7 districts (4-10). The difference between party A’s counterfactual 
seat share (30%) and vote share (50%) is the first election’s partisan bias.195 
 
 193. Cf. Cain et al., supra note 70 (manuscript at 11-14) (finding connections between 
partisan bias, the efficiency gap, and disproportionality in simulated plans); id. 
(manuscript app. at 20-23). 
 194. For additional examples along these lines, see McGhee, supra note 21, at 3-4, 7; and 
McGhee, supra note 5, at 61-63. We do not address the declination in the same detail 
due to its novelty. It is clear that the measure sometimes violates the efficiency 
principle because a seat can cross the 50% point without changing the angle between 
the two lines used to calculate the measure. In this case, a metric should register a 
difference in efficiency, but the declination does not. (Though how often the declina-
tion violates the efficiency principle remains an important subject for future study.) 
We also do not discuss the difference between the parties’ average margins of victory 
because it is essentially identical to the efficiency gap. 
 195. This result is itself problematic. Partisan bias registers a large disadvantage for party A, 
based on the hypothetical tied election, even though it won 6 of 10 seats in the election 
footnote continued on next page 
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Critically, this 20% score does not change in the second election even 
though party A earns an additional seat (District 7). In the hypothetical tied 
election, party A would still win 3 districts, so the difference between its 
counterfactual seat share (30%) and vote share (50%) is still 20%. Partisan bias 
therefore violates the efficiency principle in these examples because it does not 
shift in party A’s favor when party A extracts a larger seat share with the same 
vote share. The metric fails to register party A’s stronger performance because 
this improvement is evident only in the election that actually occurred. It is not 
evident in the hypothetical tied election that is used to calculate partisan bias. 
Similarly, the mean-median difference in the first election is 2%: the 
difference between party A’s mean vote share (55%) and median vote share 
(53%). All these figures are unchanged in the second election. The swings in 
Districts 2, 3, 7, and 9 affect neither party A’s mean vote share (because they 
offset one another) nor its median vote share (because Districts 5 and 6, at the 
center of the distribution, stay the same). The mean-median difference thus 
also violates the efficiency principle in these examples. It does not move in 
party A’s direction when it captures an additional seat with the same popular 
support because this extra seat is not reflected in party A’s mean or median vote 
share.196 
 
that in fact occurred. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 861-62 (also 
making this point). 
 196. Gregory Warrington similarly notes that “it is quite possible for packing and cracking 
to occur without having any effect on the mean-median difference.” Warrington, supra 
note 15, at 17-18. 
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Table 4 
Examples with Multiple Gerrymandering Metrics 
District 
Election 1 Election 2 
Votes Wasted Votes Votes Wasted Votes 
Party 
A 
Party 
B 
Party 
A 
Party 
B 
Party 
A 
Party 
B 
Party 
A 
Party 
B 
1 73 27 23 27 73 27 23 27 
2 73 27 23 27 70 30 20 30 
3 73 27 23 27 70 30 20 30 
4 53 47 3 47 53 47 3 47 
5 53 47 3 47 53 47 3 47 
6 53 47 3 47 53 47 3 47 
7 44 56 44 6 53 47 3 47 
8 44 56 44 6 44 56 44 6 
9 44 56 44 6 41 59 41 9 
10 40 60 40 10 40 60 40 10 
Totals 550 450 250 250 550 450 200 300 
EG (250 – 250) / 1000 = 0% (300 – 200) / 1000 = 10% 
Bias (3 / 10) – 50% = –20% (3 / 10) – 50% = –20% 
MMD 53% – 55% = –2% 53% – 55% = –2% 
Votes and wasted votes by district in two elections under the same ten-district 
plan. The efficiency gap is calculated using the full method. Partisan bias and the 
mean-median difference are also calculated. The boxed districts are those in 
which the vote distribution changes between the two elections. 
 
How typical are these examples? In other words, how often do partisan 
bias and the mean-median difference contravene the efficiency principle over a 
larger set of cases? To find out, one of us used the simulation technique we 
described above, generating 5100 district plans, 100 for each possible value of 
statewide vote share (in one-point increments) between 25% and 75%.197 For 
each increment, Figure 9 below plots the proportion of the simulated plans 
(paired in every possible permutation) that are inconsistent with the efficiency 
principle. The chart on the left is for partisan bias; the one on the right is for 
the mean-median difference. 
 
 197. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text; see also McGhee, supra note 21, at 8-9 
(describing this analysis). 
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Figure 9 
Simulations with Multiple Gerrymandering Metrics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plots of the proportion of simulated plans that violate the efficiency 
principle versus the statewide vote share of the benchmark party, for partisan 
bias (left) and the mean-median difference (right). 
 
It is clear from Figure 9 that partisan bias and the mean-median difference 
violate the efficiency principle quite often indeed. The rate of violations is 
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relatively low when both parties receive close to 50% of the statewide vote. (In 
fact, in a perfectly tied election, partisan bias never violates the efficiency 
principle.)198 But as elections become less competitive statewide, the rate of 
violations rises dramatically. This rate is about 50% when one party receives 
three-fifths of the statewide vote, indicating that in this electoral environment, 
partisan bias and the mean-median difference violate the efficiency principle 
for every other pair of simulated plans. When one party receives three-fourths 
of the statewide vote, the violation rate surges above 70%, meaning that in this 
setting, partisan bias and the mean-median difference breach the efficiency 
principle more frequently than they abide by it. 
This analysis relates not just to our first criterion (compliance with the 
efficiency principle) but also to our third one (breadth of scope). Partisan bias 
and the mean-median difference become less usable as elections grow less 
competitive statewide because they produce more violations of the efficiency 
principle. What accounts for this pattern? In the case of partisan bias, the 
explanation is that the hypothetical tied election diverges more from the actual 
election as the actual election gets less competitive. When both parties receive 
close to 50% of the statewide vote, only small adjustments to the parties’ votes 
in each district are necessary to simulate a tied election, and few seats change 
hands as a result. But when one party predominates in a state, larger 
adjustments must be made, and more seats consequently flip. These flipped 
seats are assigned to the party that actually won them for efficiency purposes, 
but to the opposing party in the partisan bias calculation. Hence the more 
flipped seats, the more often the efficiency principle is violated.199 
As for the mean-median difference, it is unsurprising that it performs like 
partisan bias because, as discussed above, it is equal to partisan bias divided by 
the slope of the seat-vote curve at the point where each party earns 50% of the 
statewide vote.200 Additionally, the weak link that exists between the mean-
median difference and the parties’ seats when elections are competitive 
statewide disappears when they are more one-sided. In competitive settings, 
inferences can be drawn about the parties’ seats from their mean and median 
vote shares. For example, if a party’s mean vote share is a bit higher than 50% 
and its median vote share is a bit lower, it is likely (though not certain) that the 
 
 198. This, of course, is the one point at which partisan bias is equal to the efficiency gap. See 
supra text accompanying note 185. 
 199. For similar arguments, see McGhee, supra note 5, at 62, 63 fig.1; and Stephanopoulos & 
McGhee, supra note 5, at 860-62. The proponents of partisan bias concede that the 
measure “is only appropriate for competitive situations where there is a potential for a 
change in partisan outcomes (majority control, in particular) as a result of shifting 
electoral tides.” Grofman & King, supra note 1, at 31. 
 200. See supra text accompanying note 189. 
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party has a narrow legislative minority despite its slim popular majority.201 
Speculative as such inferences are when elections are competitive statewide, 
they become entirely implausible when one party predominates. In these 
circumstances, the median vote share tells us which party controls more seats, 
but this is the only information we can glean from the components of the 
mean-median difference. Virtually unmoored from the parties’ seats, the 
metric rarely satisfies the efficiency principle—a test whose centerpiece is the 
relationship between the parties’ seats and votes.202 
Because the efficiency gap always complies with the efficiency principle,203 
while partisan bias and the mean-median difference increasingly violate it as 
elections grow less competitive, we might expect the measures to behave 
similarly in competitive environments but to diverge in uncompetitive ones. 
The mathematical links between the metrics support this expectation. When 
an election is perfectly tied, the efficiency gap and partisan bias are identical, 
and the mean-median difference is (as ever) a function of partisan bias.204 So the 
closer an election is to an outright tie, the more highly correlated all three 
measures should be. And the further an election is from an even split, the more 
attenuated the metrics’ connections should become. 
Figures 10 and 11 below confirm this hypothesis. They plot the efficiency 
gap (on the y-axis) versus either partisan bias or the mean-median difference 
(on the x-axis) for state house elections (Figure 10) and congressional elections 
(Figure 11). In each figure, the top row displays the measures’ relationships in 
competitive settings, where the parties’ statewide vote shares are closer than 
55% to 45%. In each figure, the bottom row shows the metrics’ connections in 
uncompetitive settings, where one party receives more than 55% of the 
statewide vote. Plainly, the efficiency gap correlates strongly with both 
partisan bias and the mean-median difference in competitive environments, in 
both state house and congressional elections. In the top row of each figure, the 
points cluster around the best-fit lines. And just as plainly, the metrics’ ties are 
weaker in uncompetitive environments, at both the state house and 
congressional levels. In the bottom row of each figure, the points are widely 
dispersed and the best-fit lines are closer to flat.205 
 
 201. See McGhee, supra note 21, at 7 (“If the median equals . . . a vote share of 0.5 . . . then 
when a seat changes hands, the median will also change and the median-mean 
difference will reflect that change.”). 
 202. The proponents of the mean-median difference agree that for the measure to be useful, 
“a jurisdiction has to be politically competitive” and “[b]oth parties have to be capable of 
winning a vote majority.” McDonald & Best, supra note 12, at 318-19, 319 n.10.  
 203. See supra Part II.A. 
 204. See supra text accompanying note 189. 
 205. For a similar finding, albeit based on simulated rather than actual election results, and 
only with respect to partisan bias, see Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 857-58.  
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Figure 10 
Relationships Between Multiple Gerrymandering Metrics for State Houses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plots of the efficiency gap versus partisan bias or the mean-median difference 
for state houses. The top row represents data from competitive settings, where the 
parties’ statewide vote shares are closer than 55% to 45%. The bottom row represents 
uncompetitive settings, where one party receives more than 55% of the statewide vote. 
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Figure 11 
Relationships Between Multiple Gerrymandering Metrics for Congressional Delegations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plots of the efficiency gap versus partisan bias or the mean-median difference for 
congressional delegations. The top row represents data from competitive settings, where 
the parties’ statewide vote shares are closer than 55% to 45%. The bottom row represents 
uncompetitive settings, where one party receives more than 55% of the statewide vote. 
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In combination, we think Figures 9, 10, and 11 above counsel against using 
partisan bias and the mean-median difference when elections are uncompeti-
tive statewide. The measures frequently violate the efficiency principle in these 
settings and are linked only loosely to the efficiency gap. Of course, one might 
disagree with this recommendation if one dismissed the relevance of the 
efficiency principle. The argument would then be that it is the efficiency gap 
that should not be used in uncompetitive environments because it diverges 
from partisan bias and the mean-median difference.206 
To respond to this challenge, we invoke a value distinct from efficiency: 
impact on legislative representation.207 Even if the point of a partisan 
gerrymander is not to win more seats with the same number of votes, it might 
be to shift the ideological makeup of the legislature in the direction of the 
gerrymandering party. That way the party is better positioned to pass its 
preferred laws—to convert mere seats into tangible policy outcomes. To assess 
the effects of the efficiency gap, partisan bias, and the mean-median difference 
on legislative representation, we run a series of regressions based on a model 
that one of us previously constructed.208 All of these regressions are for 
congressional elections because it is only at this level that data on representa-
tion exists dating back to 1972.209 The dependent variable in each case is the 
mean DW-Nominate score of a congressional delegation in a particular term. 
(DW-Nominate scores are derived from House members’ roll call votes and are 
the most widely used measure of congressional ideology.)210 The independent 
variables are a given gerrymandering metric’s value in a given election, the 
Democratic share of the statewide vote, and fixed effects (or dummy variables) 
for states and years. And we run separate regressions for each measure as well 
as for competitive and uncompetitive elections, clustering standard errors by 
state.211 
Figure 12 below plots the impact on a congressional delegation’s mean 
DW-Nominate score when the efficiency gap, partisan bias, or the mean-
median difference increases by one standard deviation, showing the effect 
 
 206. Notably, the proponents of partisan bias and the mean-median difference do not make 
this argument. 
 207. This, of course, is the same value that Chambers and colleagues bring up in the critique 
we addressed in Part III.C above. 
 208. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 69 (manuscript at 17-18); id. (manuscript app. at 27 tbl.5). 
 209. For a similar analysis of state house representation, restricted to the period from 1995 
to 2012, see Caughey et al., supra note 163. 
 210. See About the Project, VOTEVIEW, https://perma.cc/K9UG-SWJR (archived Apr. 11, 
2018). We use the mean rather than the median DW-Nominate score because it is less 
prone to large jumps from year to year. We also re-sign DW-Nominate scores so that 
positive values are liberal and negative values are conservative. 
 211. The results of the regressions are reported in Appendix A below. 
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separately for competitive and uncompetitive settings. The efficiency gap’s 
influence is unaffected by the electoral environment. In both competitive and 
uncompetitive elections, a rise in the efficiency gap of one standard deviation 
results in an increase of about 0.06 (or one-third of a standard deviation) in a 
delegation’s mean DW-Nominate score. In competitive settings, one-standard-
deviation rises in partisan bias and the mean-median difference have 
comparable effects: increases of roughly 0.05 and 0.03, respectively, in a 
delegation’s mean DW-Nominate score. But in uncompetitive environments, 
the impact of partisan bias and the mean-median difference disappears entirely. 
When these metrics rise by one standard deviation, a delegation’s mean 
DW-Nominate score does not change at all—in fact, it moves slightly (though 
not statistically significantly) in the opposite direction. 
The upshot of this analysis is that even if one rejects the efficiency princi-
ple, one still should not use partisan bias or the mean-median difference in 
uncompetitive settings. When one party predominates, an increase in one of 
these measures has no consistent effect on the ideological makeup of the 
legislature. An increase in one of these measures, that is, neither skews 
representation in favor of the gerrymandering party nor helps it enact its 
preferred policies.212 
 
 212. McGhee similarly finds that in uncompetitive elections, partisan bias has virtually no 
predictive power for a party’s seat share. See McGhee, supra note 5, at 66-68. 
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Figure 12 
Impact of Multiple Gerrymandering Metrics on Congressional Representation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The point estimates represent the impact on a congressional delegation’s mean 
DW-Nominate score of increasing the efficiency gap, partisan bias, or the mean-
median difference by one standard deviation. The bars to the left and right of the 
point estimates denote 95% confidence intervals. Separate point estimates are 
provided for competitive electoral environments (closer than 55% to 45%) and 
uncompetitive settings (further apart than 55% to 45%). 
 
Conclusion 
As partisan gerrymandering enjoys a burst of academic attention, we find 
ourselves pleased but still dissatisfied by the burgeoning literature. Pleased because 
a vitally important topic is being studied more rigorously than ever by an array of 
talented scholars. But still dissatisfied because most recent work has sought only to 
devise new measures of gerrymandering or to criticize existing ones. In this Essay, 
we have tried to do something different: to take a step back and think about what it 
is we want from a gerrymandering measure. In our view, a metric should be 
consistent with the efficiency principle, distinct from other democratic values, 
broad in scope, and empirically congruent with U.S. electoral history. And in our 
view, the efficiency gap achieves these goals while other measures often do not. 
The second point, though, is less important than the first. Our primary aim here is 
not to evangelize in favor of the efficiency gap. Rather, it is to push the academic 
debate in new and hopefully more productive directions. If we manage to do so, we 
will be satisfied even if readers remain unsure about the efficiency gap itself. 
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Appendix A 
Regressions for Each Measure Based on DW-Nominate Score 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EG EG Bias Bias MMD MMD 
Variable Competitive Uncompetitive Competitive Uncompetitive Competitive Uncompetitive 
Efficiency 
Gap 
0.650*** 0.641*** 
(0.0631) (0.0755) 
Partisan 
Bias 
0.498*** –0.0174 
(0.0694) (0.144) 
Mean-
Median 
Difference 
0.576*** –0.168 
(0.122) (0.236) 
Democratic 
Vote Share 
1.153*** 1.328*** 0.891*** 1.482*** 1.049*** 1.518*** 
(0.169) (0.253) (0.186) (0.396) (0.227) (0.374) 
Constant 
0.563*** –0.719*** 0.456*** –0.819*** –0.540*** 0.828*** 
(0.0725) (0.133) (0.0849) (0.230) (0.101) (0.210) 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 261 03 261 203 261 203 
R-squared 0.943 0.960 0.907 0.930 0.886 0.931 
This table reports the results of a series of regressions in which congressional 
delegations’ mean DW-Nominate scores are the dependent variables. The key 
independent variables are different measures of partisan gerrymandering, 
analyzed separately in competitive and uncompetitive electoral settings. The 
robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
 
